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Abstract
This Master’s thesis is a theoretical intervention. It aims to rethink key concepts of art and its edu-
cation. Especially, to interrogate the connections between emancipation, education, aesthetics and 
politics. Its conceptual practice means its approach is philosophical. All of this comes together in 
the research question: what could Rancièrean aesthetic education be? 
In this thesis, I begin by examining Jacques Rancière’s (a French philosopher) writings on method. 
His opposition to a hierarchical theoretical practice is exemplified by an adherence to egalitarian 
method and the use of topographical analysis, refusing to uncover hidden truths. Taking these meth-
odological thoughts seriously, I don’t provide a conclusive and exegetical reading of Rancière’s work, 
but a proposal of what Rancièrean aesthetic education could be.
In chapters 2–5, I engage with different aspects of Rancière’s philosophical project. First, I un-
cover the way Rancière has rethought the concept of emancipation as equality verifying action. Then, 
I move on to explore what he has written about the process of politics as something fundamentally 
polemical. Rancière’s concept of the distribution of the sensible shows the aesthetic nature of human 
communities and the process of politics. Exploration of these connections open up chapter 5, which 
moves to treat Rancière’s art theoretical writings.
I don’t want to raise Rancière to a position of mastery as the philosopher that prescribes what to 
do in e.g. education or politics. This is why I stage an encounter between Rancièrean theorization 
and the proposals of art education theorist jan jagodzinski in chapter 6. Through this, I interrogate 
the limits of Rancière’s positions and gain an understanding to what remains undertheorized or 
lacking in his work. 
I begin chapter 7 by mapping out prior art education research that comes close to my thesis. I focus 
on Anglo-American art education discourse. After this, I expose my proposal. Rancièrean aesthetic 
education has to acknowledge the fundamentally antagonistic nature of human communities. The 
aesthetic, conceptualized as the sensible fabric of human being-together, has only a limited connec-
tion to politics. It can directly alter the distribution of the sensible through works of art or open up 
possibilities of dissensus. The aesthetic cannot substitute politics. This creates other restrictions for
Rancièrean aesthetic education as it needs to remain antiteleological. 
The main limitations of my proposal are its imperative of action, undertheorized dimension of 
temporality and the lack of freedom from its conceptual repertoire. Most pressing problem for my 
proposal of Rancièrean aesthetic education is to find ways to apply it, put it to action.
This thesis shows how Rancièrean theorization can be used in thinking about art and its education. 
It provides a useful theoretical framework for exploring the connections between education, art and 
politics. 
Keywords Jacques Rancière, aesthetic education, educational philosophy, emancipation, politics,
aesthetic, Rancièrean aesthetic education
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Tiivistelmä
Tämä maisterin opinnäytetyö on teoreettinen interventio. Se tähtää ajattelemaan uudelleen taiteen 
ja taidekasvatuksen avainkäsitteitä. Se tutkii erityisesti emansipaation, kasvatuksen, esteettisen ja 
politiikan suhteita. Sen käsitteellinen työskentely tarkoittaa, että se on lähestymistavaltaan filosofi-
nen. Kaikki tämä yhdistyy tutkimuskysymyksessäni: mitä Rancièrelainen esteettinen kasvatus voisi 
olla?
Aloitan opinnäytetyön tarkastelemalla Jacques Rancièren, ranskalaisen filosofin, kirjoituksia me-
todista. Hänen vastustuksensa hierarkkista teoreettista työskentelyä kohtaan näyttäytyy sitoutumi-
sessa tasa-arvoiseen metodiin ja topografisen analyysin käytössä, piilotetun totuuden paljastami-
sesta kieltäytymisenä. Ottaen nämä metodologiset huomiot vakavasti, en tarjoa tyhjentävää ja ek-
segeettistä luentaa Rancièren töistä, vaan ehdotuksen siitä, mitä Rancièrelainen esteettinen kasva-
tus voisi olla.
Luvuissa 2–5 paneudun Rancièren filosofisen projektin eri osiin. Ensimmäiseksi näytän tavan, 
jolla Rancière on ajatellut uudelleen emansipaation käsitteen tasa-arvoa todentavana toimintana.
Sitten siirryn tutkimaan, mitä hän on kirjoittanut politiikasta perustavanlaatuisesti poleemisena
prosessina. Rancièren käsite, aistillisen jako, näyttää ihmisyhteisöjen ja politiikan prosessin luon-
teiden esteettisyyden. Näiden yhteyksien tutkinta avaa viidennen luvun, joka siirtyy tarkastelemaan 
Rancièren taideteoreettisia kirjoituksia.
En halua nostaa Rancièrea mestarin asemaan filosofina, joka määrää mitä tulisi tehdä esimerkiksi 
kasvatuksessa tai politiikassa. Tämän takia lavastan kuudennessa luvussa kohtaamisen Rancièrelai-
sen teoretisoinnin ja taidekasvatusteoreettikko jan jagodzinskin ehdotusten välillä. Tällä hahmotan 
Rancièren aseman rajoja ja saavutan ymmärrystä siitä, mikä puuttuu tai on saanut vähän huomiota 
hänen työssään.
Aloitan seitsemännen luvun kartoittamalla aiempaa, omaa tutkimustani lähellä olevaa, taidekas-
vatustutkimusta. Keskityn anglo-amerikkalaiseen taidekasvatuskeskusteluun. Tämän jälkeen esitän
oman ehdotukseni. Rancièrelaisen esteettisen kasvatuksen tulee hyväksyä ihmisyhteisöjen antago-
nistinen luonne. Esteettinen, käsitettynä ihmisten yhdessäolon aistittavana kudelmana, liittyy vain 
rajoitetusti poliittiseen. Se voi muuttaa välittömästi aistisen jakoa taideteosten kautta tai avata uusia 
mahdollisuuksia dissensukselle. Esteettinen ei voi korvata politiikkaa. Tämä luo muitakin rajoitteita 
Rancièrelaiselle esteettiselle kasvatukselle, kuten että sen täytyy pysyä antiteleologisena.
Ehdotukseni pääasialliset rajoitteet ovat sen imperatiivi toimintaan, vähän teoretisoitu ajallinen 
ulottuvuus ja vapauden puuttuminen sen käsitteellisestä repertuaarista. Painavin ongelma ehdo-
tukselleni on Rancièrelaisen esteettisen kasvatuksen soveltamisen tapojen, sen käytännön, löytämi-
nen.
Tämä opinnäytetyö osoittaa kuinka Rancièrelaista teoretisointia voidaan käyttää taiteen ja taide-
kasvatuksen ajattelussa. Rancièren ajattelu tarjoaa käyttökelpoisen teoreettisen viitekehyksen kas-
vatuksen, taiteen ja politiikan yhteyksien tutkimiseksi.
Avainsanat Jacques Rancière, esteettinen kasvatus, kasvatusfilosofia, emansipaatio, politiikka, 
esteettinen, Rancièrelainen esteettinen kasvatus
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11. Introduction
Looking at society I find many things that contradict my understand-
ing of what’s right. There are many structures that fortify barriers, keep 
at bay and distribute privileges: they create or maintain inequality. To 
describe this cultural condition, I choose to refer to neoliberal capital-
ism. I feel the urge to state that something should be done.  
But this is easily claimed, whereas providing clear cut outlines for 
action is harder. How to resist the all-encompassing capitalism in our 
lives? Consumer choice is just an illusory way of influencing society. In 
representational democracy, the right way of participation in the soci-
ety is through using one’s right to vote or posing as a candidate in the 
elections (and maybe exercising power as a representative afterwards). 
Demonstration as a concrete event dispersing to the urban milieu can 
also be seen as a good non-parliamentary way to effect choices of the 
Parliament. All of these function as a part of the system I’d like to crit-
icize and work against. What could constitute an act that would work 
outside or against neoliberal capitalism? Or is it the assumption of the 
dichotomy between inside and outside even relevant?
This is the position that informs me as a political actor, and this is 
necessarily reflected in my conceptions of art education. According to 
art educator Pirkko Pohjakallio, a new interest toward critical peda-
gogy rose in our department in the beginning of the 2000s. This turn 
drew from critical pedagogy originating from Latin and North Amer-
ican contexts (Pohjakallio 2015, 67). This has been a major influence 
in my own positioning as an art educator, and its also reflected in my 
thesis.
In this work, I engage in-depth with the work of the French phi-
losopher Jacques Rancière because I feel that Rancière’s theoretical 
2approach offers a fruitful starting point for theorizing art education 
today. For him, the question animating most of his work is: where are 
we? which 
“means two things at once: ‘how can we characterize the situation 
in which we live, think and act to-day?’, but also, by the same token: 
‘how does the perception of this situation oblige us to reconsider 
the framework we use to “see” things and map situations, to move 
within this framework or get away from it?’; or, in other words, 
‘how does it urge us to change our very way of determining the 
coordinates of the “here and now”?’” (Rancière 2009 b, 115.)
Following Rancière’s lead and asking the same questions, I find two 
questions urgent for a practioner of art education. The cultural con-
dition we live in leads to question what should be done otherwise or 
what could make a difference, how to change our way of being togeth-
er. I choose to boil this down to “what can politics mean for art educa-
tion?” Taking a cue from the tradition of critical pedagogies and pro-
gressive social movements, this leads to ask “what can emancipation 
mean today?” These two questions, in their own ways, have shaped my 
work on this thesis substantially. I argue that an inquiry into them can 
be facilitated by interrogating my main research question:
 “What could Rancièrean aesthetic education be?” 
At first, it’s not evident how the two questions come together in my 
main research question. This question is formulated through an en-
gagement with Rancière’s thinking. Aesthetics refers to the way that 
he understands the entwinement of the politics of aesthetics and the 
aesthetics of politics. This is also exemplified in the way his key con-
cept, distribution of the sensible, becomes key to understanding this 
relationship. Rancière’s theorizations have exhibited a close connection 
between politics and aesthetical practices and phenomena. Commu-
nities are for Rancière something that remain dependent on particular 
ways of perceiving. This is because these modalities guide the way in-
dividuals perceive, think and act in these constellations. Thus, modali-
ties of perceiving and modes of participation are intricately connected. 
Rancière’s thinking also provides a new way for conceptualizing eman-
cipation, also connected to aesthetics and politics. 
What kind of a theory of aesthetic education can be elaborated by 
examining the three intertwined “scenes” of emancipatory education, 
politics and aesthetic regime of art? This thesis is configured as a path 
3taking the reader from Rancière’s rethinking of emancipation, through 
the paradox of collective emancipation to the intertwining of politics 
and aesthetics. Through all of this I am able to work on the problemat-
ics of politics, art and its education within the same theoretical frame-
work.
I have opted to work on a theoretical thesis. I engage with Rancière’s 
writings and expose a reading which I justify by reference to his texts. 
This reading provides a theoretical framework in which concepts 
are defined, re-conceptualized and exposed to new relations to each 
other. I try to interrogate the possibilities and limits of this frame-
work by making references to other concepts and theorizations. All of 
this means that my work’s approach is philosophical: I present close 
readings of passages, present arguments backed up by logic alongside 
textual references. In short, I engage in a conceptual practice. 
We can see that this approach creates limitations to what this work 
can engage with. I turn to conceptual issues, such as: What kind of 
relations can we think between art, politics and education? Are there 
concepts that describe these interconnections in fruitful ways? Where 
are we when we theorize with Rancière? 
42. Method: Intervention 
As my study is deeply indebted to Rancière’s theorization, I examine 
my own methodological choices along presenting some ideas found 
from his writings on method. As I move on, I present my methodolog-
ical choices by tracing their connections and disconnections, simi-
larities and dissimilarities with Rancière’s approach. I also discuss my 
work’s methodological aims, choices and difficulties.
In my work, I don’t aim to reference or reconstruct any exact part of 
Rancièrean theorization—I intend to weave my own “theoretical fab-
ric” using the threads taken from Rancière’s work. My work should not 
be read as an exegesis of the true meaning of Rancière’s theorization. 
For example, my account of Rancièrean politics is gathered from across 
different works and thus doesn’t represent a precise argument made 
by Rancière in a specific context. My aim is to put to use the thoughts 
Rancière has exposed.
Why do I position my interpretation as only a possible one? I claim 
that Rancière’s method runs against exegetical thinking. To position 
oneself as explicating what Rancière really said just won’t do. Rancière 
subscribes to “an egalitarian or anarchist theoretical position that does 
not presuppose this vertical relationship of top to bottom” (Rancière 
2004, 50).  So there’s no foundation that is first laid out and them cul-
tivated to a more exact or elaborate theoretical construction. This has 
to be understood in opposition to a position of mastery often assumed 
by intellectuals and theoreticians. For example, when a sociologist 
explains how an object of his study doesn’t understand the conditions 
that restrains his or her life, a position of mastery is taken. The igno-
rance of the subject is assumed and the sociologist comes to say what’s 
5the hidden truth behind appearances. 
The “topography” Rancière is interest in consists “of horizontal 
distributions, combinations between systems of possibilities, not in 
terms of surface and substratum.” (Rancière 2004, 50.) This is the main 
reason I want to articulate my interpretation as only a possible one. 
Taking seriously Rancière’s claims about his method means refusing to 
expose a foundation of Rancièrean theorization and denying the pos-
sibility of explaining what he has really said. Nevertheless, I of course 
defend my interpretation and feel that it’s justified.
In his writings, Rancière constructs “a changing map of a moving 
landscape, a map that is ceaselessly modified by the movement itself.” 
In this process, concepts don’t stay static but are “instable.” (Rancière 
2009 b, 120.) This becomes evident in Rancière’s Disagreement (1999). 
In the course of his argument, Rancière constantly refines and mod-
ifies the concepts he uses. Different knots are unraveled as new ones 
manifest. Same historical events gain new meanings as they are revisit-
ed at other parts of the development. This is another reason presenting 
a definite and conclusive interpretation of Rancière’s work runs into 
problems.
Rancière recounts several things that make up the method of a 
thinker: “the issues they address, the materials they select, the giv-
ens they consider significant, the phrasing of their connection, the 
landscape they map, their way of inventing solutions (or aporias)” 
(Rancière 2009 b, 114). 
What’s very particular in Rancière’s method, is the way he
“always constructs his argumentation as a re-staging of a limited 
number of such scenes or events of discourse. It is also important 
to remark that he introduces no hierarchy in the selection of its 
scenes.” (Rancière 2009 b, 117.)
This is evident for example in his choice of scenes in Disagreement 
(1999). Events of microhistory are analyzed alongside figures like Plato 
and Hobbes—without a greater weight put on any one of them. This 
is a concrete example of how the egalitarian method works in the way 
Rancière chooses his materials. Enunciations from worker’s journals 
are treated with the same precision as textual extracts from the can-
onized philosophers of the Western tradition. This could be seen as 
verifying some kind of equality—maybe theoretical equality? 
When discussing theoretical work on emancipation, Rancière states 
that it’s necessary to “break the distribution of disciplines. This episte-
mological imperative is also a political one. To posit thought as some-
6thing that denies the separations among philosophical argumentation, 
historical explanation and literary statements is to define it as a power 
shared by just anyone.” (Rancière 2011, 23.) From this, we can see 
that, for Rancière, there’s some kind of connection with his practice of 
theory and the theoretical constructions themselves. His emphasis on 
equality shines through his work as methodological choices.
Rancière uses the metaphor of a path to describe a thinker’s method:
“A method means a path: not the path that a thinker follows but 
the path that he/she constructs, that you have to construct to know 
where you are, to figure out the characteristics of the territory you 
are going through, the places it allows you to go, the way it obliges 
you to move, the markers that can help you, the obstacles that get 
in the way.” (Rancière 2009 b, 114.)
Next, I want to briefly go over the path I’ve constructed from my 
encounter with Rancière. My work is organized into chapters. The 
textual tracing of my intellectual journey continues from this look into 
method to the restaging of the tale of Joseph Jacotot in chapter 3. The 
fundamentals of critical pedagogy were put under question during this 
encounter as the relations between knowledge and emancipation, the 
teacher and the student, were evaluated.
The logic of intellectual emancipation cannot be converted to a logic 
of social organization without reversing its prime motor; turning 
equality into inequality. Jacotot’s convictions bring to light the tension 
between the individual and the community, intellectual emancipation 
and collective emancipation. This opens up the road to politics, dis-
cussed in chapter 4.
Well before the more recent extended engagement with art, Rancière 
has studied how there is a fundamentally aesthetic side in the way 
communities organize themselves. Claims to power are made through 
different kinds of enunciations, the allocations of bodies manifest as 
visibility and invisibility, workers’ emancipation shows itself as aesthet-
ic contemplation and so on. The fifth chapter is opened by exploring 
this connection between politics and aesthetics. From there, focus 
shifts to the art theoretical discussions.
Rancière doesn’t see his writings as presenting theories of art or 
aesthetics. Instead, he sees them as “polemical interventions” because 
“they imply a polemical view of what ideas are and do.” Rancière aim, 
in any given situation, is to shift our attention to what “is the polemi-
cal nature that makes it an object of thinking, that situates it in a field 
of tensions”. As an example, his works on politics explores instances 
7where disputes are raised, like when the meaning of democracy is 
contested. This means that he “is only interested in ideas at work.” 
(Rancière 2009 b, 115–116.)
It is following this idea of polemical intervention, that I have opt-
ed to stage an encounter between my reading of Rancièrean theory 
and the proposals of art education theorist jan jagodzinski. My aim is 
to interrogate the limits of my theoretical framework formed in the 
previous chapters by this move: to see what needs further theorization. 
This is also an attempt in using egalitarian method. Rancière is not 
taken to have said everything as the philosopher. Instead, jagodzinski’s 
project is seen as a challenge to Rancièrean theorization, asking: “did 
you think about this?” 
In the seventh chapter, I gather the threads picked up so far and 
weave a novel theoretical patch work from it: a proposal for what 
Rancièrean aesthetic education could be. Rancière states that “[a] 
foundation [...] is always a ‘might be’ or an ‘as if ’, which is reached 
afterwards, at the end of a process” (Rancière 2009 b, 119). This is re-
flected in my research question as I don’t want to provide a new foun-
dation for art education theory in the ontological sense. I’m looking 
into what Rancièrean aesthetic education could be – and not what it is.
My thesis is theoretical. I carve out a theoretical framework through 
my reading of Rancière’s work. This tries not to be conclusive, since I 
think that would run against Rancière’s method, as I’ve mentioned. I 
define concepts, reformulate them in new contexts, look at how their 
positions shift in regard to one another and carve out their limits. I try 
to interrogate the possibilities and limits of this framework by making 
references to other concepts and theorizations. All of this means that 
my work’s approach is philosophical: I present close readings of pas-
sages, put forth arguments backed up by logic alongside textual refer-
ences and engage in a conceptual practice.
This means that the work is restricted in several ways. Its material are 
philosophical texts and research articles. Text itself becomes an appa-
ratus for exposing the conceptual practice I have engaged in. The phil-
osophical approach makes it difficult to, for example, tackle questions 
about the utilization of new media in art classrooms or the changes in 
curriculum design in the Finnish context.
As such, my philosophical thesis aims at putting to use insights from 
Rancière’s work. It should be seen as a theoretical intervention. It is 
an attempt to examine ways of conceptualizing key concepts for art 
education: concepts like art, the aesthetic, politics and emancipation. I 
argue that these can be seen in a useful theoretical constellation when 
8viewed as Rancièrean aesthetic education.
In the last chapter, Conclusions, I recapitulate insights from my 
journey. I look to the conceptual landscape formed by the conceptual 
practice of philosophizing. I ask, what does the view contain and what 
can be seen shimmering at the edges? I speculate on what could be dif-
ferent, what could be rendered more visible and what might lie outside, 
what I wasn’t able to bring to light. I return to the considerations on 
method and evaluate what I did. 
93. Equality of Intelli-
gences: Intellectual 
Emancipation
As educational philosophers Charles Bingham and Gert Biesta note, 
the historical roots of the term emancipation go as far back as the 
Roman law. As they explain, emancipation meant the legal act through 
which the father of a family relinquished his legal authority over his 
son. “Emancipation literally means to give away ownership (ex: away; 
mancipum: ownership). More broadly, it means to relinquish one’s 
authority over someone. This implies that the ‘object’ of emancipation, 
that is, the person to be emancipated, becomes independent and free as 
a result of the act of emancipation.” (Bingham, Biesta 2010, 27.)
Through the tradition of enlightenment, the notion of emancipation 
entered critical and progressivist pedagogies. In this context, emanci-
pation from power relations becomes important. This is a problem of 
knowledge, since “emancipation can be brought about if people gain an 
adequate insight into the power relations that constitute their situation 
– which is why the notion of ‘demystification’ plays a central role in 
critical pedagogies.” (Bingham and Biesta 2010, 28–29.) 
Ideology is, according to Biesta and Bingham, the key insight of 
Marxism in educational discussions. Ideology provides a way to elab-
orate a logic of emancipation, what Biesta and Bingham have dubbed 
the modern idea of emancipation. Ideology is something that works on 
peoples’ minds secretly, without them being aware of its functioning. 
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This “means that in order for us to achieve emancipation, someone 
else, whose consciousness is not subjected to the workings of power, 
needs to provide us with an account of our objective condition.” This 
comes down to the dependence of the one in need of emancipation to 
the one with the right consciousness. (Bingham and Biesta 2010, 26.) 
This modern conception of emancipation is formally asymmetrical. 
There’s a Marxist intellectual, that knows what the others don’t and 
needs to come and rescue them – to emancipate them. It’s arguable 
that a similar view outlines in one way or another critical pedagogies. 
A way out of this conception of emancipation is outlined in Rancière’s 
writings on education.
Rancière’s principal work on the topic of education is The Ignorant 
Schoolmaster1, published originally in 1987. According to Rancière 
himself, the book was written as a response to the denial of the possi-
bilities of emancipation and conjunction with the evaluation of social-
ist tradition in the French intellectual field of the time (Rancière 2009 
a, 115). 
The Ignorant Schoolmaster recounts the story of Joseph Jacotot, who 
in 1818 discovered something that shattered his views on education. 
He had witnessed Dutch students learn French without anyone in-
structing them. Jacotot had only given them, from his view, an unsur-
mountable task of learning the language French from a bilingual edi-
tion of a book, Les Aventures de Télémaque by Fénelon. To his surprise 
the students not only learned to discuss Télémaque in French but also 
composed essays on its topics. Having believed that learning always 
demands explication from the part of a teacher, Jacotot’s world was 
shaken: no knowledge was transmitted via explication, but the students 
nevertheless learned. (Rancière 1991, 1–3.)
Not content with leaving the issue at this, Jacotot continued his 
investigation. Experience with not-teaching French successfully put 
under question the whole logic of explication, that of seeing learning as 
transmitting knowledge to the students. Jacotot went further and tried 
to teach that which he didn’t know, that which he ignored. (Rancière 
1991, 101.)
Jacotot dubbed his method universal teaching and it roused 
1  Rancière’s Ignorant Schoolmaster can be seen as taking part in a discussion 
on French schooling, and its inadequacy and plans for its reform, since the 1960s. 
Rancière criticized especially the position put forth by Bourdieu and his followers. 
On Rancière’s own statement of the critique against Bourdie’s pedagogical revision-
ism, see e.g. (Rancière 2010 b, 10-12), another account of the context is provided by 
the translator’s introduction by Kristin Ross.
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far-reaching polemic in his days — word of this new “method” circu-
lated in Europe and reached as far as Rio de Janeiro. According to Jaco-
tot’s principles, anyone could teach anything to anyone. It didn’t matter 
if one didn’t have knowledge of the subject and in this fashion illiterate 
parents were able to teach their children how to read and write. The 
starting point was something that the pupil had knowledge of, e.g. a 
prayer learned by heart. This was epitomized by his maxim “everything 
is in everything”. (Rancière 1991, 18, 31.)
The act of universal teaching consisted of the simple steps of de-
manding and verifying. The schoolmaster was there just to loan his/
her will to the learner. This was a crucial step. In traditional tutelage, in 
Jacotot’s words stultification, two intellects were connected. The stul-
tifying master subjugated the students’ intelligence to his or her own. 
The master had the knowledge of the gap that forever separated them. 
This resulted in the student never being able to close the gap: there’s 
always more to learn, more to explain, a bit more distance to close. 
(Rancière 1991, 13.)
In stultification the gap between the two intellects was verified by the 
intermittent acts of explication. The master explicator promises fill the 
gap with his explications but this never happens, there’s always a new 
explication needed. Thus the explicative logic becomes never ending. 
(Rancière 1991, 4–9.) But how can this vicious cycle be overcome?
What’s crucial from Rancière’s point of view, is the difference Jacotot 
introduced as regard to the assumptions of the schoolmaster. Master 
explicator always assumes the inequality between him/herself and the 
student, that is, inequality of intellects is assumed. Jacotot runs counter 
to this. According to universal teaching, all intellects are equal. In the 
act itself, the assumed equality is verified: the learner is capable of the 
same things as the others are capable of—even the master of the peda-
gogical relationship. (Rancière 1991, 4, 39.)
In Jacotot’s method knowledge was uncoupled from the act of eman-
cipation. It was no longer a case of distributing the knowledge about 
the real conditions of the emancipated. Emancipation becomes the act 
of verification of the equality of intelligence of anyone. Nor was it the 
case that a veil of “false consciousness” was lifted. This is how the mod-
ern conception of emancipation is sidestepped by Rancière-Jacotot.
Failed experimented, such as application of the method in a mil-
itary academy, convinced Jacotot to view his method as something 
that could never provide a social logic. Jacotot went on to note that 
intellectual emancipation could never result in a social logic: it would 
only prepare people to live as emancipated in a world ridden with 
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social inequality. Trying to force equality into the social would result 
in transforming it into equality. This is because Jacotot equates social 
logic with the logic of explanation: “it is a way in which the social or-
der is presented and reproduced.” (Rancière 1991, 79, 102–103, see also 
Rancière 2010 b, 6–9.)
So it seems that we are running into a kind of problem for the art 
educator committed to social change. “The act that emancipates an 
intelligence has, on its own, no effect on the social order” (Rancière 
2010 b, 14–15). If one accepts Rancière’s proposal of sidestepping the 
problems of the modern conception of emancipation, one encounters 
the problem of not having any way to improve or even change the 
social reality. This seems to be reinforced by Rancière’s statement at the 
end of On Ignorant Schoolmasters, presented in Rio de Janeiro State 
University in June of 2002, returning to the themes explored in The 
Ignorant Schoolmaster:
“Affirmation of these simple principles in fact constitutes an un-
precedented dissonance, a dissonance one must, in a way, forget in 
order to continue improving schools, programs and pedagogies, 
but that one must also, from time to time, listen to again so that 
the act of teaching does not lose sight of the paradoxes that give it 
meaning.” (Rancière 2010 b, 15–16.)
So the promise of intellectual emancipation falls short of being a 
guideline towards some utopian community. It remains something 
necessarily tied to the individual level. But this was the case for intel-
lectual emancipation. But how has Rancière treated the social or the 
political in his writings? Can we gain a further understanding of eman-
cipation from there?
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4. Equality in Action: 
Rancièrean Politics
Rancière has not tried to introduce another political theory or a doc-
trine of political philosophy by his writings on the topic. Neither has 
he started out from a general theory of the subject nor from ontologi-
cal principles, and then gone on to elaborate another political theory. 
(Rancière 2009 b, 114, 117–118.) 
What he has tried is to do, is to 
“reconstruct not a political theory but a dramaturgy of politics. 
Between the contemporary aporias of consensus and this formula 
it is possible to weave the main threads of a dramaturgy of politics, 
conceived out of its limits, a dramaturgy of politics conceived as 
the development of this paradox of ‘power without power’ that is 
meant by the word ‘democracy’.” (Rancière 2009 b, 119.)
This dramaturgy happens by exploring different “ ‘extreme’ forms of 
staging of democracy.” Through this, “we can frame an understanding 
of the polemical relationships between the structures of constitutional 
governments and the forms of autonomous political action. We can 
also draw from it an orientation for democratic action: democratic 
action is the form of action which carries out the disruption of any 
ultimate legitimacy of power, or, if you turn it on its positive side, the 
affirmation of the equal capacity of anybody.” (Ranière 2009 b, 120.) 
Already from this we can see that for Rancière, politics is radical in the 
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sense that it disrupts the legitimacy of existing institutions. There’s also 
a close connection between his understanding of politics and equality.
Rancière sees that his works on politics form a sort of continuum 
with the previous works (The Nights of Labour and The Ignorant 
Schoolmaster) that re-examined the concept of emancipation. He 
sees views the works on emancipation and equality as a sort-of start-
ing point for his writings on politics (from On the Shores of Politics 
to Disagreement). These writings should of course be understood in 
their historical context. Rancière remarks that the fall of the “Soviet 
Empire” marked a shift in theoretical discussions from “the debate on 
the virtues or crimes of Marxism” to “the thesis of the ‘end of history’ 
achieved in the global triumph of consensual democracy. But as con-
sensual, liberal democracy was hailed as triumphant, Rancière points 
out that at the same time there were “new ethnic and religious wars in 
former communist countries and the new forms of racism and xeno-
phobia in so-called ‘democratic countries’.” (Rancière 2009 b, 115.)
For Rancière, politics is not some external sphere separate from other 
aspects of human life. It’s not the phenomenon unfolding in the parlia-
ment of a nation state. Nor is it the people’s voice coming out in elec-
tions, no matter how inclusively the population has the right to par-
ticipate. And contrary to what’s usually thought, it’s not the exercise of 
power. Politics is “a specific mode of action that is enacted by a specific 
subject and that has its own proper rationality.” (Rancière 2010 a, 27, 
emphasis in original.) So politics is for Rancière above all else action—
not just some ideal to be attained or some sort of static configuration 
of institutions and positions. 
Politics is definable because of its form. It is always a clash of two 
logics, two counts of the community and two distributions of the sensi-
ble (Rancière 2010 a, 39.) In Rancière’s words, the distribution of the 
sensible is
”the system of self-evident facts of sense perception that simulta-
neously discloses the existence of something in common and the 
delimitations that define the respective parts and positions within 
it. A distribution of the sensible therefore establishes at one and the 
same time something common that is shared and exclusive parts. 
This apportionment of parts and positions is based on a distribu-
tion of spaces, times, and forms of activity that determines the very 
manner in which something in common lends itself to participa-
tion and in what way various individuals have a part in this distri-
bution.” (Rancière 2004, 12.)
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A distribution of the sensible is in a sense an “implicit law” that shapes 
the way we perceive the world around us. Through affecting our 
sensory experience, this distribution renders things and agents visible 
or invisible. It prescribes modes of being and roles in the community. 
(Rancière 2010 a, 36.) In this way, the distribution of the sensible des-
ignates the framework in which human life is lived in.
According to Rancière, politics is not necessary – in fact, “it occurs 
as an always provisional accident within the history of forms of domi-
nation.”  In the usual case, human communities are organized accord-
ing to the logic of domination. Those that possess the qualifications to 
rule, do that, while others are subjugated to their power. The qualifica-
tions differ from the specific community and time. Nonetheless, some 
principle for having the right to rule exists. Politics runs against this. It 
“exists as a deviation from this normal order of things.” (Rancière 2010 
a, 35.)
This usual “order of things” is a certain distribution of the sensible. 
It is based on an inegalitarian logic and Rancière calls it the police. It 
doesn’t designate simply the law enforcing agent, nor is it equivalent 
to the state apparatus. Rather, it is a distribution of the sensible which 
states that “society here is made up of groups tied to specific modes 
of doing, to places in which these occupations are exercised, and to 
modes of being corresponding to these occupations and these plac-
es.” (Rancière 2010 a, 37.) So the practices of nation states rely on the 
police but are simply reduced to them (Rancière 1999, 29.) The police 
proposes a view of the community that is static and all-encompassing. 
Everyone has a place and a role in this distribution. Each is acknowl-
edged as part of a certain group and the “image” of the community as 
a whole is achieved.
But the police is not only this order, it is also “the set of procedures 
whereby the aggregation and consent of collectivities is achieved, the 
organization of powers, the distribution of places and roles, and the 
systems for legitimizing this distribution.”  So the police is also the 
process that produces the “image” of the community and forces its sus-
tenance. In addition to the implementation, it also provides a justifica-
tion for its own existence. (Rancière 1999, 28.) 
In its totalizing function, the police states that everyone has a place, 
everyone has a role and that each has been counted. So the police 
comes down to a count of the community devoid of any void. There’s 
no room for any surplus, because this would create a fracture to the 
order—destabilizing the whole constellation and putting its justifica-
tion into question. (Rancière 2010 a, 37.) 
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In a liberal democracy, politics is often viewed, in more or less, as 
follows: there is a decision making body, which “represents” the com-
munity at large. This is how the partition into those that rule and those 
that are ruled is legitimized. As part of this, every citizen has a right 
to vote in the elections. The governing body has thus a justification 
to make decisions that regulate all the individuals that make up the 
community. Laws are formulated, which mold the positions and inter-
actions between the individuals. Thus the distribution partitions places 
and roles through legislation. This illustrates some of the ways that 
the police works in a liberal democracy.  If a picture like this is held to 
describe a political system, then the police is mistaken for politics.
For Rancière, police is always in opposition to the process of politics. 
However, this does not mean that the police is necessarily something 
simply and totally bad. According to Rancière, we can compare dif-
ferent polices, and “one kind of police may be infinitely preferable to 
another.” (Rancière 1999, 30–31.) This makes sense. Take for example 
a police that simply exterminates nonconformists, and one that plac-
es heavy economic sanctions on them. It seems evident that, without 
further details, the first one should be deemed worse.
The process of politics starts when the distribution of the sensible 
as the police is put into question. This happens by “disturbing this 
arrangement by supplementing it with a part of those without part, 
identified with the whole of the community “(Rancière 2010 a, 37).
But how is this questioning conducted?  
What politics does, according to Rancière, is to configure its own 
space. Since there’s no natural or original place for politics to happen 
(like some institution or part of the state apparatus), it has to create an 
event for its own appearance—to show its subjects and operations. This 
happens through the “manifestation of dissensus as the presence of 
two worlds in one.” Dissensus means “a gap in the sensible itself ” – the 
story told by the police is not everything. The two worlds don’t simply 
display different opinions or interests. It’s not a dialog in which groups 
compare their differing views. “Political demonstration makes visible 
that which had no reason to be seen; it places one world in another.” 
This means that the demonstration shows something that’s already ex-
isting in the world. It shows something that has been rendered invisible 
in the distribution of the sensible. (Rancière 2010 a, 37–38. emphasis 
original). 
“Dissensus brings back into play both the obviousness of what can 
be perceived, thought and done, and the distribution of those who 
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are capable of perceiving, thinking and altering the coordinates of 
the shared world. This is what a process of political subjectivation 
consists in: in the action of uncounted capacities that crack open 
the unity of the given and the obviousness of the visible in order to 
sketch a new topography of the possible.” (Rancière 2009 a, 49.)
So what is the subject of politics that gains a stage for appearance 
through dissensus? It is the empty operator: the demos as “[t]he people 
that comprises the subject of democracy” But this does not designate 
any subgroup of the community bound together by similar interests, 
because that would just fall back to the police’s partitioning of places. 
The “demos is the supplementary part in relation to every count of the 
parts of the population, making it possible to identify ‘the count of the 
uncounted’ with the whole of the community.” (Rancière 2010 a, 33, 
emphasis original.) 
The police operates in order to provide a totalizing account. It parcels 
out roles and places for everyone. Since politics runs counter to this, 
it has to compromise the police (ac)count. This means making visible 
the ones that have been rendered invisible in the count, and it is here 
that the demos, as the empty operator, comes to play. Paradoxically the 
demos is comprised of the ones that have no part in the community; 
the ones that are not counted. Through becoming visible, they present 
themselves as the whole of the community. In Rancière’s words:
“The ‘all’ of the community named by democracy is an empty, sup-
plementary part that separates the community out from the sum of 
the parts of the social body. This initial separation founds politics 
as the action of supplementary subjects, inscribed as a surplus in 
relation to every count of the parts of society.” (Rancière 2010 a, 
33.)
This appearance of the people should not be understood as something 
illusory and therefore opposed to reality. The common field of expe-
rience as the distribution of the sensible is something that’s put under 
question by the appearance of the people. The police account becomes 
compromised. (Rancière 1999, 99.)
But what’s democracy doing here? In the context of Rancièrean theo-
ry, it’s not what it’s usually taken to be. Here, democracy is not a certain 
way of governance. Nor is it equitable to certain institutions. It is “the 
very regime of politics itself as a form of relationship that defines a 
specific subject.” (Rancière 2010 a, 31.)
The communities that are set up as the result of the playing out of 
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politics are polemical communities—they are the result of the clash of 
two distinct logics: “the police logic of the distribution of places and 
the political logic of the egalitarian act.” (Rancière 1999, 100.) 
Equality takes the form of a wrong in the process of politics. It’s as 
the wrong that the universal of equality gains its political significance. 
This fundamental wrong cannot be settled because it’s something 
undeterminable. Equality is not some endpoint for political action, it’s 
simply the assumption that needs to be verified. As this verification is 
endless and the police can’t do anything but resist it, the wrong cannot 
be swiped away or treated. It can only be processed through the taking 
place of politics. Equality as the wrong provides the meeting point of 
the two logics that make up politics. (Rancière 1999, 39.)
Political subjects are the product of subjectivation2. This happens 
”through a series of actions of a body and a capacity for enunciation 
not previously identifiable within a given field of experience, whose 
identification is thus part of the reconfiguration of the field of expe-
rience.” (Ranière 1999, 35.) The “new” body Rancière talks about has 
to assert itself as something not parceled out in the distribution of the 
sensible.
As a certain distribution parcels out roles, it also inscribes identities. 
A subject is provided with an identity, guaranteeing a place in the given 
order. A subjectivation always happens through a dis-identification, as 
“a removal from the naturalness of a place, the opening up of a subject 
space where anyone can be counted since it is the space where those of 
no account are counted, where a connection is made between having a 
part and having no part.” As one dis-identification happens, the whole 
distribution that has prescribed the now rejected identification is put 
under question. Because the whole distribution is threatened, is the 
subject position open for other subjectivations to happen. This doesn’t 
create subjects “ex nihilo” because it’s always a transformation or a 
displacement taking place in the distribution of the sensible. (Rancière 
1999, 36.)
Political subjectivation opens up “a subject space where anyone can 
be counted since it is the space where those of no account are count-
ed, where a connection is made between having a part and having no 
part.” Because the dis-identification happens in relation to the distri-
bution of the sensible, it necessarily happens in relation to the commu-
nity. Thus, “A political subjectivation is the product of these multiple 
fracture lines by which individuals and networks of individuals subjec-
2  I’ve decided to use the word subjectivation, even though some of my citation use 
a different translation (e.g. subjectification) of the French term la subjectivation.
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tify the gap between their condition as animals endowed with a voice 
and the violent encounter with the equality of the logos.” (Rancière 
1999, 36–37.) This means that when political subjectivation opens up, 
it’s available to everyone.
Politics doesn’t itself have any space or some special qualification that 
would demarcate it clearly from other kinds of activities. But poli-
tics”happens by means of a principle that does not belong to it: equali-
ty.” This doesn’t mean that equality would be some ideal to be attained 
or the utopian endpoint. “It is a mere assumption that needs to be 
discerned within the practices implementing it.” (Rancière 1999, 33.)
The process of politics disrupts the police as the distribution of the 
sensible. The clash of the two logics, that of equality and the inegali-
tarian opposite, brings about “insciptions of equality.” In this way the 
distribution of the sensible is reconfigured. The Declaration of the 
Rights of Man [sic] is one example Rancière mentions. These inscrip-
tions alter the common world itself and also provide platforms or 
starting points for further politics. 3 (Rancière 1999, 42, 87.) The police 
is not overthrown as in a revolution. The old order is not substituted 
by a new one. But nonetheless something has changed. New roles in 
the distribution might have been opened up. Or bodies might have 
shifted places. Or someone’s opinion might be recognized as of value. 
(Rancière 1999, 29–30.) As the process of politics plays out, something 
positive happens.
All of this comes down to revealing the contingency of any social 
order imposed by the police through the process of political subjectiva-
tion. (Rancière 1999, 101.) This is what we could call collective eman-
3  This needs to be stressed: things like the Declaration of the Rights of Man or the 
concept of human rights have their significance only in their relation to the process 
of politics. Rancière doesn’t see them as something having “intrinsic” worth. These 
rights in fact only mean something “[w]hen such groups [as e.g. clandestine immi-
grants] can […] make something of these rights to construct a dissensus against the 
denial of rights they suffer.” Rancière has also attacked Giorgio Agamben’s position 
on human rights. Without going to too much detail, I state that Rancière’s critique 
centers on how he perceives Agamben reducing the paradigm of right to something 
that is necessarily guaranteed by a sovereign (e.g. a modern state), which in turn sub-
jugates the one the right “belongs” to. Rancière sees that this kind of thinking doesn’t 
allow rights to have any “positive” merit in politics. (Rancière 2010 c, 71.) An exact 
presentation of Rancière’s position and critique is found in the article just cited.
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cipation4 in a Rancièrean context. It’s simply the process of politics un-
folding as the polemical verification of equality of anyone. Rancière’s 
succinct statement of this:
“Collective understanding of emancipation is not the comprehen-
sion of a total process of subjection. It is the collectivization of 
capacities invested in scenes of dissensus. It is the employment of 
the capacity of anyone whatsoever, of the quality of human beings 
without qualities.” (Rancière 2009 a, 49.)
In Disagreement, the longest elaboration on politics by Rancière, 
Rancière sees that even the smallest inscriptions of equality are signifi-
cant. They are marks of that “the power of the people, exists.” For him, 
“The problem is to extend the sphere of this materialization, to maxi-
mize this power”, which “means creating litigious cases and worlds of 
community in litigation by demonstrating the difference of the people 
from itself under whatever specifications.” (Rancière 1999, 87—88.)
Bingham and Biesta go on to make a connection between all of 
this and emancipation. Since the intellectual emancipation of Jacotot 
consisted of actions verifying the equality of intelligences, so can the 
process of politics be seen as a process of verifying equality. As this 
happens through dissensus and subjectivation, “emancipation can be 
understood as a process of subjectification [sic].” (Bingham and Biesta 
2010, 33.) Jan Voelker sees also that Disagreement, is an effort to shot 
that “[e]mancipation can then be thought at the level of communities” 
(Voelker 2011, 68). 
So politics is for Rancière first and foremost action. Verification of 
equality, creating inscriptions of equality in different manifestations. 
This through the process of subjectivation with, dissensus as the man-
ifestation of two worlds in one is its’ starting place. The clash between 
two logics, the “meeting of police logic and egalitarian logic that is 
never set up in advance.” (Rancière 1999, 32).  So virtually anything 
can become the stage for politics. The workplace, immigration bureau 
or the art classroom. But next, I want to turn to what I find most inter-
esting in Rancière’s work: the way he sees the intertwining of aesthetics 
and politics. 
4  Rancière has elsewhere used the notion of “social emancipation” in connection 
with workers’ emancipation. In that context, what becomes important is the indi-
vidual worker’s relation to his or her occupation and the restrictions evident in it. 
(Rancière 2009, 42.) This seems to be different from collective emancipation, but 
nonetheless the connection is close.
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5. Equality and the Aes-
thetic
Rancière sees his writings on aesthetics as continuing the path already 
embarked on in his writings on politics. This means that one of the 
motivations for a focus on the aesthetic was to elaborate on “thinking 
of politics in terms of ‘distribution of the sensible’”. Another arose from 
an opposition to the postmodern as “a form of global description of a 
time and a world deprived of any perspective of collective emancipa-
tion.” (Rancière 2009 b, 115–116.)
In A few remarks on the method of Jacques Rancière, Rancière 
elaborates on his use of the word “aesthetic”. The choice of word lends 
to ambiguity, which of course is not an accident. First, it refers to the 
aesthetic regime of art, which I’ll return to shortly. Second, it names 
“a dimension of human experience in general.” In this latter sense, it 
refers to what the senses can perceive. It follows that the connection 
between “the aesthetic” and politics is twofold. First, there are certain 
ways in which the aesthetic names “speciﬁc forms of linkage existing 
between the forms of the aesthetic regime and the modern forms of 
politics -- [and] the way in which political actions and conﬂicts are 
conﬂicts about the distribution of the sensible.” (Rancière 2009 b, 121.) 
The latter connection has been treated in more detail on the chapter on 
politics. The distribution of the sensible is always aesthetic in nature: 
as it prescribes positions, it acknowledges who’s thought of as a speak-
ing being and whose not. When it discloses a count of the community, 
it renders the recognized visible and denies visibility from those not 
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taken into account. In this way, there’s a straightforward link between 
the aesthetic and the process of politics.
Rancière refers to a regime of art as something constituted by several 
things. Certain objects, forms and so on have to be acknowledged as 
forms of art and not as something else. This happens by recognizing 
certain practices as artistic practices. In this way, a regime of art is 
meshed together with a certain distribution of the sensible. The dis-
tribution parcels out roles for artists, just as it does the roles of factory 
workers. (Rancière 2011, 18.)
Rancière’s aim has not been to propose all-encompassing frame-
works, but to write about how something has come to be seen as art, 
how the possibility of viewing something as art has come to be. This 
means “at one and the same to historicize the transcendental and to 
de-historicize these systems of conditions of possibility.” The regimes 
should not be thought of as delimiting certain historical periods—even 
though their conditions of possibility can be seen as emerging from 
historical events. Several different regimes in fact exist at any one time 
and certain works can even display characteristics of more than one. 
(Rancière 2011, 18.)
Rancière has distinguished three different regimes of art: the ethical, 
representational (or poetic) and the aesthetic regimes (Rancière 2004, 
20). What concerns my study the most is the last regime, but for pur-
poses of describing it, I’ll shortly introduce the two others.
In the ethical regime, art doesn’t exist as a recognized and distinct 
sphere of practice. For example, images are made, not art works. What 
becomes paramount is how images effect the individuals and the 
community they make up. Do the images create illusions by projecting 
a false simulacrum? Rancière cites Plato’s opposition to the pictorial 
arts, theatre and some forms of literature to give an example. (Rancière 
2004, 20–21.) 
Aristotle’s writings on mimesis provide the prime example of the 
representative or poetic regime of art. Poetic, referring to ancient 
Greek concept of poiesis, because certain practices, “ways of doing 
and making”, are brought together under the label of art. And repre-
sentative, because these practices are delimited from other kinds by 
their adherence to the mimetic principle. This principle declares first 
that it is imitations that count as artistic productions. Second, it orders 
the different imitations according to their substance matter, tragedy as 
the high point of all art. It is because mimesis situated clearly the arts 
within the social reality, that is the distribution of the sensible, that the 
arts could for the first time be named and be seen as something auton-
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omous. (Rancière 2004, 22–23.)
Whereas the representative regime posited the correspondence be-
tween subject matter and artistic form, the aesthetic regime marks the 
disconnection of these two. Rancière cites Flaubert’s Emma Bovary in 
exemplifying this disconnection: the love affairs of a common woman 
became the subject of literature. Thus whatever could be represented in 
whatever medium and manner. (Rancière 2004, 32.)
This also marks the break between the relation of poesis and aisthe-
sis. By poesis, Rancière refers to the ways of making.  Aisthesis makes 
a connection between different faculties: between “feeling and under-
standing, which means the connection between a capacity of feeling 
and a capacity of understanding (Rancière 2009 b, 121). This break 
comes down to there being “no more rules allowing us to say why 
things are beautiful or not, no more presupposition of a correspond-
ence between the rules of art and the laws of sensibility” (Rancière 
2011, 12). This break is not only limited to experiences of works of art 
but it amounts to a disruption in the logic of the police (Rancière 2009 
b, 121). Thus the aesthetic regime marks the disruption of the distribu-
tion of the sensible that based the demarcation underlying the repre-
sentative regime.
The aesthetic regime provides several ways in which artistic practices 
or art works can disrupt the distribution of the sensible. An aesthetic 
form of equality can disrupt the way works are evaluated on the base of 
their subject matter. This breaks the way the works were “appreciated 
according to rules of taste defined by a specific public.”  The museum 
setting exemplifies this. In a museum, any visitor may view any of the 
works there. Prior, the same works (e.g. portraits of monarchs) might 
have been only subjected to the appreciation of nobles. The works lend 
themselves unconditionally to an undifferentiated gaze—the gaze of 
anyone at all. Thus we have “a form of equality which is not, strictly 
speaking, political equality, but nevertheless contributes to the refram-
ing of the common landscape, to the reframing of the distribution of 
the possible.” Since new people are admitted to have the capabilities of 
seeing required to contemplate the work, the distribution of the sensi-
ble is altered. New capabilities are allocated to bodies which were not 
affiliated with them previously. (Rancière 2009 b, 121–122.)
The art of the aesthetic regime thus relies on “the implementation of 
a certain equality” (Rancière 2004, 52–53). But if aesthetic equality is 
something different from the equality at the heart of politics, what’s the 
nature of the connection between the aesthetic and the political?
There are two ways in which the aesthetic can “do” politics. First, 
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the aesthetic “tends to break through the surface of political forms of 
equality to reach true equality or rather to dismiss equality in favor of 
the sympathy or fraternity of the subterranean drives or impersonal 
rhythms and intensities of collective life” (Rancière 2009 b, 122). This 
is because somehow, Rancière tells, the equality at play in the art of the 
aesthetic regime, differs from equality in the process of politics. This 
means that there’s a danger of replacing politics with something else, 
namely replacing political equality with aesthetic equality, thus render-
ing politics inoperative. 
Second, the aesthetic can contribute to making new forms of po-
litical subjectivation thinkable by “the reframing of forms of experi-
ence” (Rancière 2009 b, 122). This is the result of the close connection 
between politics and aesthetics already examined. In an article called 
Aesthetic Separation, Aesthetic Community (2009), Rancière has fur-
ther elaborated on the possibilities of thinking about the connections 
between subjectivation, politics, communities and the aesthetic. This 
is done in the context of the history of art and artistic practices. I now 
turn to this development of thought. 
Let’s take a small step back to the aesthetic regime of art. Rancière 
has declared that the aesthetic relies on a twofold separation. First, the 
art work doesn’t any longer have a certain function that prescribes the 
adequate form. Its destination no longer prescribes its form, as was the 
case in the representative regime.  For example, peasants portrayed 
in genre paintings had to stand less impressive to the portraits of the 
patrons that ordered them. The nobler the subject of painting, the 
more prestigious the form had to be, also expressed by choosing more 
valuable pigments. Thus the form followed function and destination. 
(Rancière 2009 a, 69–70.)
The second “separation” refers to the way the work is situated in 
the distribution of the sensible. The work is no longer dependent on 
a certain partition “of social places and functions.” The poetic side of 
the representative regime entailed that artistic practices are recognized 
as a distinct sphere of activity: they are a way of doing and making 
in their own part. The aesthetic regime blurs the boundary between 
art and non-art. As anything can become the subject of art, this can 
now happen by any means. And this is what breaks the dependence of 
artistic practices on a certain distribution of the sensible. Since there’s 
no definite way to separate the ways of making specific to the arts, they 
can no longer be accounted for in the distribution of the sensible in an 
exhaustive way. Thus the arts no longer rely on any determinate distri-
bution. (Rancière 2009 a, 70.) 
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But what do these two separations and aesthetic efficacy have to do 
with communities and political subjectivation? Rancière describes 
three propositions that all display being together in being apart, being 
separated but paradoxically tied together at the same time. The second 
proposition5 taken up by Rancière is an art project realized in a Paris-
ian suburb by an artist group Campement Urbain (Urban Encamp-
ment.) In the project, I and Us, the habitants of the area were invited 
to plan a place for quiet meditation and being alone—something that’s 
not a usual action in the lives of the people. Paradoxically the project 
established a community around the activities of planning a space for 
solitude, separation from the others. (Rancière 2009 a, 53–54.)
The paradoxical communities of separation are aesthetic commu-
nities. “Human beings are tied together by a certain sensory fabric, a 
certain distribution of the sensible, which defines their way of being 
together” and were already familiar with the implications for politics. 
This means that “[a]n aesthetic community – is a community of sense.” 
(Rancière 2009 a, 56–57.) So the aesthetic community is a community 
that’s woven together by a certain distribution of the sensible.
The aesthetic communities explored in more detail by Rancière, 
like the I and Us-project, take the form of a dissensual community 
(Rancière 2009 a, 57–58). But what should we make of this? 
I would argue that Rancière sees several ways in which the I and 
Us-project works in a dissensual manner. First, as an aesthetic art 
work, it functions through a dissensual operation, that “takes the form 
of a superimposition that transforms a given form or body into a new 
one.” This means that the work acts as if it were something it’s not: 
it pretends to be separated from everyday experience, but in fact, it’s 
made up of the everyday experience of the people involved in it. In 
the aesthetic regime of art, there’s no distinctive boundary between 
the everyday experience and aesthetic experience. (Rancière 2009 a, 
66–67.)
Second, the art work’s form is that of a dissensual figure, one es-
tablished through a separation. This happens through the form of a 
“‘dissensual figure’ of the community: staging of “a conflict between 
two regimes of sense, two sensory worlds.” (Rancière 2009 a, 58.) The 
quiet spot of the art work is juxtaposed to the busy life of the suburb. 
“To the extent that it is a dissensual community, an aesthetic commu-
nity is a community structured by disconnection” (Rancière 2009 a, 
5  The first being a statement from Mallarmé’s prose poem, The White Water Lily, 
and the third a citation from Deleuze’s and Guattari’s What Is Philosophy? (Rancière 
2009 a, 51–57).
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59). What keeps the members separated, actually becomes the thing 
uniting them. 
 We already know from chapter 4 how Rancière sees dissensus. It 
is the manifestation of two worlds in one, which opens up a stage for 
politics to happen. Dissensus enables political subjectivation. Aesthetic 
Separation, Aesthetic Community proposes some ways to see dissensus 
in the context of art, and this will be my focus next.
Rancière stresses that “[u]nderstanding exactly what is disconnected 
[in the dissensual community] and what is at stake in that discon-
nection is crucial to interpreting what ‘aesthetics’ and the ‘politics of 
aesthetics’ mean” (Rancière 2009 a, 59). And this is what Rancière calls 
aesthetic efficacy.
At the heart of artistic practice lies the “tension between two statuses 
of artistic practice: as a means for producing an effect and as the reality 
of that effect.” The two aesthetic separations taken a look at earlier 
(work and its destination, art and its reliance on a distribution of the 
sensible) manifest in aesthetic efficacy. This effect is the break of the 
link between cause and effect. (Rancière 2009 a, 59, 63, 69.)
All of this results in that “[t]he very same thing that makes the 
aesthetic ‘political’ stands in the way of all strategies for ‘politicizing 
art’. Rancière lashes out against “critical art” that he sees as assuming 
“the continuity of the representative cause-effect schema” but trying to 
appropriate the aesthetic break in it. This is done by assuming that cer-
tain artistic practices lead to political mobilization, artists raise aware-
ness in the viewers with their own political aims in mind. But Rancière 
states that this idea of cause and effect is mistaken. That “[t]here’s no 
direct road from intellectual awareness to political action. What occurs 
instead is a shift from a given sensible world to another sensible world 
that defines different capacities and incapacities, different forms of 
tolerance and intolerance. What occurs are processes of dissociation.” 
These cannot be calculated and they can manifest everywhere, at any 
time. (Rancière 2009 a, 74–75.)
Rancière also describes a mistaken way of working around the pitfall 
of critical art. Sometimes the failure of critical art is taken to testify 
the uselessness of mediation between the work and the future political 
action. By mediation I mean the art work raising awareness, being the 
mediator between the separation and the being together, as the work 
being the separation and the coming political activity the being to-
gether. Rancière sees that from this, some artists have gotten the idea 
that they can attain the goal of the coming community by making the 
work into that community. This comes down to the work being the 
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“direct anticipation of ‘being together’ in ‘being apart’. (Rancière 2009 
a, 76–78.) But seeing the future community actualize in a participatory 
art work inside a white cube, is no witnessing the process of politics.
In the interview given for the English translation of Politics of Aes-
thetics, Rancière has elaborated on how “there is no criterion for 
establishing an appropriate correlation between the politics of aesthet-
ics and the aesthetics of politics.” An example that Rancière explores in 
this context is the film The Deer Hunter as an example of the Ameri-
can films of the 70s and 80s that treated the war in Vietnam. Rancière 
sees that in this film, “the war scenes are essentially scenes of Russian 
roulette.” According to Rancière there are two ways to see this. The 
film could be viewed as proclaiming the “derisory nature of war” but 
at the same time, the inverse can be stated just as well. The film can be 
seen to pass judgement on the protests against the war. (Rancière 2004, 
61–62.)
The aesthetic effect has political effect as long in the sense it raises 
a conflict about the distribution of the sensible. It cannot be used to 
frame a collective body as the work of art. Nor is it just a statement 
about the distribution as what should be changed. The aesthetic effect 
is “a multiplication of connections and disconnections that reframe 
the relation between bodies, the world they live in and the way in 
which they are ‘equipped’ to adapt to it. It is a multiplicity of folds and 
gaps in the fabric of common experience that change the cartography 
of the perceptible, the thinkable and the feasible. As such, it allows 
for new modes of political construction of common objects and new 
possibilities of collective enunciation.” But all of this happens under 
the assumption of the aesthetic effect: the dis-identification cannot be 
calculated. (Rancière 2009 a, 72–73.)
So artistic practices “can open up new passages towards new forms 
of political subjectivation.” For this to be successful, it needs to be 
acknowledged that the there’s an “aesthetic cut that separates outcomes 
from intentions and preclude any direct path toward an ‘other side’ of 
words and images.” (Rancière 2009 a, 82.)
Rancière suggests as some kind of guideline for making art that side-
steps the two strategies that don’t admit to the aesthetic cut: “construct-
ing the work as the very tension between the apart and the together. 
This is true of works that try to explore the tension between the two 
terms, either by questioning the ways in which the community is tenta-
tively produced or by exploring the potential of community entailed in 
separation itself.” (Rancière 2009 a, 78.) 
In Rancière’s thinking we find a strong intertwining of aesthetics and 
28
politics. What’s more straightforward is the aesthetic side of politics. 
According to Rancière, “the question of the relationship between 
aesthetics and politics be raised at this level, the level of the sensible 
delimitation of what is common to the community, the forms of its 
visibility and of its organization.” (Rancière 2004, 18.) And this is what 
can be understood through the concept of the distribution of the sen-
sible. 
The relationship between artistic practices and politics is a more 
difficult issue. Aesthetic equality is not political equality and there’s al-
ways the danger of replacing the political equality by the aesthetic one. 
The aesthetic regime of art is tied to a change in the distribution of the 
sensible, and as such, has political implications.
But the aesthetic efficacy, which underlies art’s political potential 
is also something that denies it. When the aesthetic (and art in the 
aesthetic regime) lend a hand to politics, it’s through dissensus and 
as such, can never be calculated or manipulated in advance without 
becoming something else.
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6. Polemics: Encounter 
with jagodzinski 
In this chapter I orchestrate a dialogue between existing art education 
theorization and my reading of Rancière exposed in the previous chap-
ters. As I used Rancièrean theory to rethink how politics and emanci-
pation can be conceptualized, now I want to see what’s missing, what’s 
left unwritten and what’s beyond my reading of Rancière. In a way, I 
want to stage a clash between my reading of Rancière and the work of 
art education theorist jan jagodzinski.
The choice of jan jagodzinski is a more or less a subjective one. In my 
opinion, jagodzinski’s practice of theory is well-founded and sound, 
and I share his interest in a philosophical approach. What’s more, I find 
his political investments to my personal liking. jagodzinski has en-
gaged with highly philosophical art education theorization for decades. 
In recent years, he has turned to the work of Deleuze and Guattari, as 
well as Alain Badiou’s philosophy, while still holding out to some key 
insights from a period invested heavily with psychoanalytic theory. 
Similar theoretical frameworks are somewhat popular in Anglo-Amer-
ican theoretical and philosophical discussions of art education6. This 
means that it’s possible to view this engagement with jagodzinski as ex-
6  For example, British art education theorist, Dennis Atkinson has written uti-
lizing the work of Lacan, Deleuze and Guattari as well as Badiou (see e.g. Atkinson 
2012), Canadian Jason Wallin has worked from a Deleuzo-Guattarian framework 
(e.g. Wallin 2012), as has also Charles Garoian (e.g. Garoian 2014).
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emplifying the possibilities7 of Rancièrean theorization in the context 
of art education. In the context of this study, this encounter also helps 
to reorient my inquiry. 
jagodzinski draws heavily on contemporary art examples and discus-
sions. Even though Rancière also discusses recent art works and de-
bates (especially in Rancière 2009 a), jagodzinski’s approach of almost 
exclusively drawing from recent developments is unlike Rancière’s ap-
proach. It should be kept in mind that jagodzinski participates mainly 
in Anglo-American art education discussions. Because the theoretical 
framework differs greatly, I hope that the encounter will be fruitful.
In what follows, I’ll focus on two articles by jagodzinski: Postmet-
aphysical Vision: Art Education’s Challenge In an Age of Globalized 
Aesthetics (A Mondofesto) (2008) and Beyond Aesthetics: Return-
ing Force and Truth to Art and Its Education (2009). The first article 
examines contemporary challenges for art education and utilizing a 
manifest-like exposition argues for a new theoretical foundation of art 
and its education. The latter examines the problem of representation 
and utilizes key concepts especially from Alain Badiou’s philosophy. 
These two pieces seem to be complementary to a certain limit. More 
importantly, these two writings offer good concepts for challenging 
what I’ve previously discussed in this work. Also, some of the key 
aspects of jagodzinski’s work seem to remain similar in later works—as 
the analysis of designer capitalism and the critique of new technology 
(in jagodzinski 2015) and the emphasis on contemporary art evident 
in e.g. when reading the Occupy movement’s strategies through the 
lens of artistic practices (in jagodzinski 2013). 
jagodzinski develops further the Deleuzian notion of society of con-
trol, introduced briefly in Postscript on the Societies of Control (1992), 
naming it “designer capitalism.” For jagodzinski, our contemporary 
reality is invested with an “illusionary freedom”. Our movements are 
not restricted as long as we have the right signifiers, such as a passport 
of a satisfying country or enough money on our bank account. Sites of 
consumption present themselves as playgrounds of freedom and as we 
stroll through them, designer capitalism continually tracks our hab-
its, all the time redesigning its structures to increase monetary gains. 
(jagodzinski 2008, 147–149.) New developments, like the gathering 
and the analysis of big data, are used for the same purposes—to better 
the mechanisms of marketing to increase profits (jagodzinski 2015, 
289). This society is described as a circuit of power by jagodzinski: 
7  Exemplary, not conclusive since further research needs to be done to evaluate 
this more thoroughly.
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micro-power is “ubiquitous throughout control societies” (jagodzinski 
2008, 148).
Rancière doesn’t provide such a detailed analysis of society. What 
might be seen as coming closest to a social critique is the discussion of 
consensus—developed in more detail at the end of Disagreement. In 
the contemporary context, Rancière refers to consensus when he de-
scribes how politics is denied by contemporary political elites as neo-
liberal austerity politics are enforced globally. (Rancière 1999, 95–140.) 
But here the difference between Rancière’s consensus and jagodzinski’s 
designer capitalism is not its content but its object.  Consensus is a way 
of structuring governance—it is a way of denying politics and substi-
tuting it with the police. Designer capitalism should not be viewed as 
an alternative, but instead as complementary to the concept of consen-
sus. The analysis of the circuits of power in designer capitalism should 
be seen as describing a certain distribution of the sensible; this is the 
police as we have come to know it in our daily lives. 
Relations of power don’t play as big a role in Rancière’s work as in 
jagodzinski’s analysis. For Rancière, politics is not a relation of power 
or a struggle for power. There are different sites invested with relations 
of power throughout society (Rancière 2009 b, 118). For example, we 
can find a housewife subjugated by a husband, which clearly counts as 
a relation of power. But according to Rancière, this doesn’t itself make 
the particular scene political. If the particular allocation of parts is put 
to question through dis-identification on the part of the dominated, 
we have a process of politics unfolding.  (Rancière 1999, 32–33.) This is 
the reason Rancière hasn’t analyzed power in depth: it’s not a defining 
factor for the process of politics. As such, a relation of power doesn’t 
provide more than a possible starting point for the process of politics. 
However, a conception of Rancièrean aesthetic education could be 
enriched by the inclusion of power to its theoretical repertoire.
But what could be thought of as emancipation in jagodzinski’s 
thinking? I think that it would mean an escape from designer capital-
ism. An escape beyond the control; somewhere outside of the power 
circuit. (jagodzinski 2009, 340.) So the change jagodzinski argues for is 
directed at the field of art education: there’s a need to change the ways 
of teaching (and making) art. And the reason is the struggle against 
designer capitalism. In jagodzinski’s picture, it seems that the struggle 
can be won and a place (or abyss) of freedom lies as the desired end 
state.
Rancière’s analysis of emancipation is different. Rancièrean emanci-
pation is equality verifying action. jagodzinski seems to hold emanci-
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pation as the goal to be attained by certain kinds of actions. This means 
that to follow my interpretation means that jagodzinski adheres to a 
modern conception of emancipation at least in the sense that emanci-
pation is emancipation from somewhere. Also, this state that is striven 
towards is designated as a state of freedom. Nevertheless, jagodzinski 
doesn’t refer to what he proposes as emancipation, so this interpreta-
tion needs to be taken with a grain of salt. 
At first sight, it seems that jagodzinski’s proposal is very totalizing. 
jagodzinski seems to argue that all new technologies necessarily con-
tribute to designer capitalism. The only thing that seems to step out of 
its clutches is “some art” because “its social transformative potential is 
not lost given the contemporary socio-historical context of designer 
capitalism” (jagodzinski 2009, 339, emphasis original). I will return to 
the role of art in jagodzinski’s work later, but from this we could make 
the conclusion that art has the potential of being or moving something 
outside of designer capitalism. This would mean that social change 
pursued would be a relocation of social reality beyond capitalism, or 
possibly an overturning of capitalism—a revolution.
The change in Rancièrean context is a redistribution of the sensi-
ble. The idea of change evident in a redistribution is not as radical or 
totalizing as for example in the case of a revolution. The redistribution 
doesn’t bring about anything new: it reorganizes in the relational and 
spatial sense the partitions allocated in the original distribution. In 
this sense, it’s not so much a revolution as a modification of what was 
prior. Nothing is moved outside of the initial state, but the state itself is 
altered. But in the sense of collective emancipation, the result would be 
a new distribution which bears the traces of and inscriptions of equali-
ty introduced by the process of politics.
But to subscribe such a totalizing reading to jagodzinski, wouldn’t do 
justice to his work. Just to cite one problem for an interpretation like 
the one above, is jagodzinski’s acclaim of the work of Michael Moore’s 
“docu-fictions”. According to jagodzinski, these “beat capital and the 
state at its own game” by revealing some truth through “the powers 
of the false.” (jagodzinski 2008, 158.) So in this case, economically 
successful culture products, undoubtedly part of designer capitalism 
in one way or another, have potential for change. Thus the question 
cannot be simply about what’s inside or outside of designer capitalist 
spaces or practices.
Before turning to jagodzinski’s more exact proposals concerning 
art and its education, let me make a further remark about the general 
change proposed. The struggle for the change is not supposed to run 
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against designer capitalism straight but it “confronts the ‘society of con-
trol’ anamorphically, in an oblique way and not head on” (jagodzinski 
2009, 341, emphasis in original). jagodzinski articulates this as a step 
away from other articulations of politics. The struggle against capital-
ism has to be anamorphic to escape the problem of representation.
In jagodzinski’s arguments, representations take a key-role. He sees 
that “[u]nder designer capitalism the liquid self is potentially no longer 
branded by color, gender, sex-orientation, moral judgment, class and so 
on, but through market labels and customer loyalty.” jagodzinski seems 
to equate identities with representations. What’s more, these are what 
designer capitalism thrives on. The emerging identities only provide 
new representations, which are appropriated by the system; they, for 
example, enable more refined marketing strategies. (jagodzinski 2008, 
148–149, emphasis in original.)
The equivalency of identity and representation comes from psycho-
analysis. In Lacanian theory, the ego is always something illusionary. 
Of the three Lacanian psychic registers of the Imaginary, Symbolic 
and Real, the latter interests jagodzinski the most. In jagodzinski’s 
writings, the Symbolic and Imaginary are somehow associated with 
falseness, illusion and control, whereas the Real promises an “abyss of 
freedom”. Identities are construed in imaginary terms, and linguistic 
representations also play a role in this. But it’s the Real, as the register 
that’s paradoxically nowhere and everywhere that breaks the neatly 
rational misrecognition of the Ego. This psychoanalytic insight is what 
fuels jagodzinski’s opposition to the over-emphasis of cognition in the 
field of art education and his opposition to representations in general. 
(jagodzinski 2008, 152–156.)
Combining the concept of the Real with a Deleuzo-Guattarian 
concept of the virtual, jagodzinski argues for recognition of the virtual 
Real in art and its education. This is not just to create an ethical ap-
proach. According to jagodzinski, this is the only way to escape design-
er capitalism. (jagodzinski 2009, 345.) Identity politics play out accord-
ing to the Ego, which results only in new representations and become 
appropriated to the system. 
In the Rancièrean picture, we find a different critique of representa-
tional identities. For Rancière, an identification is always a partition 
in the social prescribed by the distribution of the sensible. This means 
that subjectivation has to happen through a dis-identification. In a 
reciprocal move, the social place prescribed by the distribution of the 
sensible is contested and a new space opened for the people to take 
stage, altering the social whole. In the end we get a redistribution of the 
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sensible. So there are parallels between Rancière’s subjectivation as a 
dis-identification and jagodzinski’s critique of representational identity 
politics. For jagodzinski, an identity is something that’s false and it can-
not provide a starting point for struggles against designer capitalism. 
For Rancière, the key is also not subscribing to a certain identity, but to 
contest the given ones.
jagodzinski views visual culture pedagogy in a negative light. The 
new technologies seem to only further the conquest of designer cap-
italism. Video games express the same illusory freedom evident in 
designer capitalism’s reality, where “blogs and myspace.com are often 
narcissistic rants.” (jagodzinski 2008, 148–151.) But if visual culture 
pedagogy cannot overcame the obstacles, what’s jagodzinski’s propos-
al? 
According to jagodzinski, art and its education should strive to go 
beyond the realm of representation. jagodzinski develops his argument 
with reference to artistic examples from contemporary artists. For art 
to escape the clutches of designer capitalism, an artist “can maneuver 
the gaps, utilize the waste, become trash, refuse to participate, and 
hack the passwords at the boundaries to reach into the abyss of free-
dom.” This results in art that acts “as an affective becoming or force.” 
(jagodzinski 2008, 152–153.) In this way, art has to strive away from 
being reduced to a sign or a representation exploitable by designer 
capitalism.
jagodzinski sets two conditions for this: “a relocation of the aesthetic 
from its hegemonic location as a (prosthetic) eye in designer capital-
ism to the body, and (2) a disbursal or decentering of the commodi-
fied art object into the processes of becoming that take into account 
the technological specificity of recording and playback.” (jagodzinski 
2008, 154.) So art works capable of inciting change work in a different 
modality than the one trapped by designer capitalism. In addition, art 
works should escape becoming commodities by becoming events. The 
result: “[t]he process of art and its education of affective becoming 
open up new worlds of experiential possibility.” Art gains an ability to 
disrupt the “the habitualized self of desire” (jagodzinski 2008, 153–
154). 
This has some similarities with Rancièrean theorization, where art 
provides a starting point for dissensus and the playing out of politics. 
Even though the conditions set forth by jagodzinski are more exact 
than we can find in Rancière’s writings. There seems to be a similar dis-
ruption of the order, a conflict introduced to expose the contingency of 
the police, to put the distribution of the sensible into question. 
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But there is one main difference. Whereas Rancière warns against the 
metapolitical danger, replacing politics with something else (like the 
aesthetic), jagodzinski could be read as doing just this. The escape from 
designer capitalism happens through the promise of some art. In this 
way we get a picture, where the virtual Real is somehow recognized or 
caught through art, and it completes the picture: the utopian abyss of 
freedom is attained. This means disregarding the fundamental polemi-
cal nature of human being together.
What demarcates Rancièrean theorization maybe most significantly 
is its insistence on an egalitarian method and a topographical analysis. 
jagodzinski seems to position himself as an intellectual that prescribes 
a way forward. This creates a hierarchical formation much like in a case 
of the traditional schoolmaster: the master explicator. At the end of the 
mondofesto jagodzinski restates the theory he has mapped and calls his 
text a “foundation” for a new art and its education (jagodzinski 2008, 
159). This is something Rancière has avoided. For example, in the case 
of his political writings he has not aimed at providing “a theory of pol-
itics, setting the principles for political practice” (Rancière 2009 b, 120, 
emphasis original). So Rancièrean theorization should be antifounda-
tional in the sense of steering away from setting up foundations or sets 
of principles which prescribe what needs to be done. 
To close this chapter, I want to highlight what I learned from this 
encounter with jagodzinski.
First, there seems to be a certain inadequacy evident in Rancièrean 
theorization when it comes to the individual or particular subject. The 
distribution of the sensible, seems to be inadequate when it comes 
to an analysis the situation of a particular subject. The distribution 
is something that organizes particulars in relation to the whole and 
Rancière’s portrayal of politics shows that the count is not all that there 
is—the police is challenged by those not accounted by it. But nonethe-
less, this picture doesn’t describe the situation of the subject in the local 
context. What kind of a situation is the acceptance of the role pre-
scribed by the distribution? Why does a subject take up the position? 
This affective level8 of the subject seems to be missing from Rancière’s 
work. 
jagodzinski’s analysis of designer capitalism and the notion of the vir-
tual Real do seem to provide a more adequate starting point for unrav-
8  Juuso Tervo also mentions in his doctoral dissertation (which I will examine a 
bit more in the next chapter), that Rancière’s theoretical work lacks “the affective level 
of politics”, which we can find in e.g. Deleuzo-Guattarian theorization (Tervo 2014, 
294).
36
eling these intricacies. However, Rancière has expressed an opposition 
to the hierarchical theoretical analysis of the unconscious as something 
unknown and unknowable to the subject. Because of the subterranean 
form of psychoanalytic analysis, a position of mastery would seem to 
follow. This applies especially to the notion of the virtual Real, since 
its connection to Lacanian theorization is explicit. But we can see a 
problem of the same form just as well in designer capitalism as social 
critique: it seems that jagodzinski argues that the consumers in design-
er capitalism really don’t know how they are controlled and this is part 
of the continuity of the system. But the issue is more nuanced than can 
be explored in detail here9.
Second, jagodzinski’s analysis of designer capitalism raises questions 
about the very abstract nature of Rancière’s social theorization. The 
analysis of consensus provides a powerful critique of the form of gov-
ernance but does it really describe our life in contemporary capitalism? 
In many aspects the power circuits of control deliver a more detailed 
and satisfactory analysis of our situation. For example, the mechanisms 
of control in our socio-historical context have developed such accura-
cy through digital technology, analysis of big data and so on, that they 
increasingly penetrate our lives. If we take this control and think of it 
as a form of governance: is it really guided by similar principles as in 
the Greek polis of the Antiquity?
Third, we can see from this encounter that the way we conceptualize 
change is of paramount importance. In jagodzinski, we see a picture 
that’s close to totalization in regard to this question. Everything is in 
the danger of being assumed under designer capitalism with little room 
for resistance. New technologies only contribute to more effective 
capitalistic exploitation or control. The role of some art becomes that of 
a savior: the only way to the abyss of freedom. Rancièrean conceptual-
ization of change as the redistribution of the sensible tries to resist this 
danger: nothing lies outside and nothing comes to the rescue: there’s 
9  For example, the relationship in psychoanalytic theory between the “emancipa-
tor” and the one being “emancipated” should be interrogated in more depth. In my 
opinion, we’re unlikely to find the same formal relationship as evident in e.g. Marx-
ism. If the Real is the register that introduces a gap into the Symbolic-Imaginary, 
then it’s something common to all the subjects, without a subject position beyond 
it. In this respect, Rancière’s critique of the unconsciousness, as the beginning of an 
analysis necessarily hierarchical, seems too hasty: the possibility for a master position 
seems impossible. Knowledge, because its position as the end result of analysis, is also 
something that should be analysed in more detail to be able to examine the difference 
more fully.
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only the sensible and its reconfiguration. What has changed, are the 
inscriptions of equality evident in the new distribution.
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7. Rancièrean Aesthetic 
Education
Before turning to elaborate on my proposal for Rancièrean aesthetic 
education, I’ll shortly introduce some of the writing10 in the area of art 
and education that has utilized Rancière’s writings from a perspective 
similar to mine. Besides brief mentions (like that found in jagodzinski 
2013, 22–23), some writers have taken up key concepts from Rancière 
to further develop or complement their own ideas11. For example, art 
education theorist Dennis Atkinson has used Rancièrean theorization 
to add to his theoretical framework, which draws more heavily from 
Alain Badiou, Lacanian psychoanalysis and Deleuze-Guattarian the-
ory12. Others have set forth to enlarge Rancièrean theorization—like 
Kurt Thumlert in his article Affordances of Equality: Ranciere, Emerg-
10  The art education discourses I am referring to below are mainly Anglo-Amer-
ican. This is a subjective choice to limit the discussions I’ll try to cover, also necessi-
tated in part by linguistic competencies. Rancière has also been used in the Finnish 
context, but not, to my knowledge, from a perspective directly related to this study.
11  Like Educational theorist Jane McDonnell who has utilized Rancière’s writings 
on politics and aesthetics, alongside Chantal Mouffe’s and Gert Biesta’s work, to take 
part in the British discussions on the role of art in relation to education of “democrat-
ic citizenship” (in McDonnell 2012).
12  See especially the exposition of Atkinson’s theoretical framework in the second 
chapter of Atkinson Art, Equality and Learning. Pedagogies Against the State 
(2011).
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ing Media, and the New Amateur (2014), to which I will return in the 
Conclusions–chapter. 
Harder to capture in brief is the utilization of Rancièrean theoriza-
tion found in my supervisor’s, Juuso Tervo’s, doctoral dissertation. The 
study interrogates the question “what does it mean to act politically” 
in the context of art education theorization (Tervo 2014, 6). The key 
concept of “subjectification”13, defined for the context of the study as “a 
constitution of subjectivity that has a social/societal agency”, provides 
the “entryway to the strategies of politicization in art education” (Tervo 
2014, 17). The theoretical framework for this interrogation of the polit-
ical in art education is formed by a reading of Rancière’s writings as a 
“radical politics of actualization.” The framework includes a reading of 
Giorgio Agamben’s political philosophy as a “radical politics of poten-
tiality.” (Tervo 2014, 12.) Tervo engages with different art education 
discussions, mainly from the Anglo-American context, in order inter-
rogate conceptualizations of art education’s politics. The goal of this 
critique is “to propose an ontological shift in a political imagination” 
(Tervo 2014, ii). The goal of re-conceptualizing the politics of art edu-
cation is also similar to the underlying motivations for my thesis.
This brief survey shows that Rancièrean theorization has been 
found useful in the field of art education theorization before. But what 
about my perspective? Is there research on art and education that use 
Rancière’s writings in the context of aesthetic education or something 
similar?
From what I am aware of, the engagement of educational philoso-
pher Tyson E. Lewis, comes closest to what I’ve been interested in14. 
Rancière’s work is examined in great detail in his book The Aesthetics 
of Education. Theatre, Curiosity, and Politics in the work of Jacques 
Rancière and Paulo Freire15, where he orchestrates an in-depth en-
13  I have opted to use the term subjectivation in this study but here keep to Tervo’s 
choice of term.
14  A writer who has drawn from Rancière’s writings and applied the notion of 
aesthetic is Arne De Boever. He presents an interpretation of Rancière’s writings 
on method and coins a dichotomy of approaches: the logic of representation and 
presentation. Utilizing the latter is seen as opening up a “scene of aesthetic educa-
tion.” (De Boever 2012, 70, 79-80.) I find De Boever’s interpretation, without going to 
detail, differing from my own and therefore won’t explore his position further.
15  Lewis has also written an article that’s partly based on the book (Lewis 2013). 
The novel import is the examination of the three different cases where “contemporary 
crises in art are mirrored in contemporary theories and practices of education.” All 
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counter between the work of Rancière and the seminal figure of peda-
gogy of the oppressed, Paulo Freire.
There are many converge points between my reading of Rancière’s 
writings presented in chapters 2–5 and Lewis’s interpretation in The 
Aesthetics of Education—so many that I don’t have the space to note 
all of them here.  The aesthetics of education are examined through 
a similar reading of Rancière’s project with an emphasis on the inter-
connectedness of the political and the aesthetic. The book points to 
aspects of Rancière’s project which have remained unarticulated—like 
the lack of treatment of freedom16, evident especially in discussions on 
emancipation. What I find most interesting in Lewis approach, is the 
way he is able to extend Rancièrean theorization. For instance, from an 
examination of Rancière’s writings on Louis Althusser17, Lewis is able 
to extend the concept of stultification. He argues that “stultification 
is far from a monolithic practice (as Rancière often describes it), and 
instead is a complex set of processes that produce a variety of possible 
effects” (Lewis 2014, 31). In other instances, Lewis is also able to take 
Rancière’s writings further18. This happens for example in the way he 
develops Rancière’s central political metaphor of theatre. He goes on 
to extract different aspects of this metaphor: “the space of the stage, 
the time of interruption, the performance of the “as if…” and finally 
the spontaneity and improvisation of the script.” (Lewis 2014, 39–40.) 
This further explores Rancière’s fundamental thesis of the aesthetics 
of politics, elaborating the capabilities of taking the political metaphor 
these proposals “betray the promise of sensorial redistribution that forms the heart 
of Rancière’s theory of democratic dissensus.” Lewis summarises this: “the aesthet-
ic promise of dissensus is broken when the ambiguities of atopia transform into 
relational proximity, “lifelong” colonization/overdetermination, or institutionalized 
hierarchies.” (Lewis 2013, 53–61, 66.) 
16  Lewis argues that there’s are fundamentally Kantian aspects to the notion of 
freedom we can construct from Rancière’s writings (Lewis 2014, 73–82).
17  Althusser was Rancière’s teacher. Later, the student broke away from Althusseri-
an Marxism to formulate his own work.
18  In Lewis more recent article, “Move Around! There is Something to See Here”: 
The Biopolitics of the Perceptual Pedagogy of the Arts (2015), he sets out to go 
beyond Rancière’s writings using concepts from other theoreticians. The Rancièrean 
concepts of the aesthetic regime of art, pensiveness and police are mainly utilized 
and a “pedagogical model of the aesthetic regime of the arts” is put forth, extending 
Rancièrean theorization to explore biopolitics. (Lewis 2015, 53–60.) 
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seriously.
In what follows, I intend to use what ideas I’ve myself gathered from 
my encounter with Rancière’s writing and use them—put them to 
action in the field of art education. I utilize notions that Rancière has 
used in different kinds of contexts and apply them to sketch out an 
idea of aesthetic education. This means that I draw e.g. from discus-
sions of art works and explore how they could be used in the context 
of aesthetic education19. So my aim is not to lay a foundation using the 
work of Rancière. It just happens that my theoretical journey has wan-
dered through his oeuvre and the insights and their interconnections 
come from his work. This is why I have chosen to label my proposal 
Rancièrean aesthetic education. As an entry point to my conceptual-
ization, I want to briefly note Rancière’s discussion of Schiller’s idea of 
aesthetic education.
Rancière asserts that Schiller responded to the failure of the French 
Revolution by elaborating his conception of aesthetic education. Ac-
cording to Rancière, the goal glimmering in Schiller’s mind was that 
of “a revolution transforming not only the forms of the State but the 
forms of sensory life” (Rancière 2011, 12). This would result in “a free-
dom and an equality that are sensible realities and not simply legal and 
governmental formulas.” This would be a truly Aesthetic Revolution. 
(Rancière 2009 b, 122.) This forms the radical promise of Schillerian 
aesthetic education. The goal is to transform the being together of hu-
mans, the sensible reality, into a more egalitarian one. This is supposed 
to escape the dead-ends of political change through revolution.
But there’s a metapolitical danger in all of this, which was already 
touched upon in the last chapter: substituting politics with something 
else. The aesthetic could be seen as taking the place of politics20. This 
would mean refusing the foundational dispute of politics. But Rancière 
also acknowledges that the aesthetic metapolitics “continuously inter-
19  There’s an important point to acknowledge here. Careless application of con-
cepts across phenomena, topics and disciplines sometimes creates problems, like the 
metapolitical danger of substituting politics with something else. I’ll return to the 
point about metapolitics below and in general, I’ll aim to use concepts in appropriate 
connections. 
20  An extreme example of this can be found from the Soviet Revolution. Interro-
gation of this historical point in more detail is beyond the scope of this thesis, but 
Rancière sees that “the program of the aesthetic Revolution in which art suppresses 
itself in creating no longer works of art but forms of life, was inextricably interwoven 
with the construction of the Soviet Revolution” (Rancière 2009 b, 122).
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feres in politics and contributes to weaving the fabric of the political, 
its words, images, attitudes, forms of sensibility, etc...” (Rancière 2009 b, 
122.)
So to begin my proposal for what Rancièrean aesthetic education 
could be, the process of politics has to be recognized as what it is—and 
not put under threat of being substituted by something else. If we think 
about the practice of consensus, what it tries is to deny politics, to only 
assert that there are e.g. economical laws that prescribe what needs 
to be done and only a scientific elite knows how to govern the social 
body. This is parallel to a situation in which art is seen as promising an 
egalitarian future and artists come to present their works that directly 
fashion the coming social body. This also replaces the fundamentally 
polemical and antagonistic nature of politics with a utopian aesthetic 
equality.
Recognizing politics as what it is leads to think of the social from a 
new perspective. It is the antagonistic or polemical relationship out-
lining all human being together. From recognizing the aesthetics of 
politics, we can locate this social in the fabric of the sensible in contin-
ual movement that facilitates our being-together, the distribution of 
the sensible. This can be thought of the stage21 of Rancièrean aesthetic 
education: the relations between the participants become a sensible 
reality to all. This escapes seeing the stage only as a network of relations 
of power, but instead as a fluxuating landscape of shifting positions 
and roles. This means that the roles of teacher and student still exist—
there’s the possibility of the emergence of the ignorant master—but 
these roles cannot be fixed. So there is a possibility of experimentation 
in spatio-temporal fabric.
The politics of aesthetics creates an important restriction for 
Rancièrean aesthetic education. The aesthetic can lend to the process 
of politics two things: the possibility of redistribution of the sensible 
through a work of art and the possibility for opening up dissensus. The 
works of art in the aesthetic regime directly alter the distribution of 
the sensible, pointing to aesthetic equality (e.g. break of the hierarchy 
in aesthetic form). But this doesn’t happen through a proper subjec-
tivation and doesn’t count as a process of politics. Nevertheless, it can 
leave its own important marks on the distribution of the sensible. In 
some cases, aesthetics works can open up a space for dissensus, which 
may lead to the playing out of politics. Recognizing these limits means 
acknowledging the threat of the metapolitical in the case of aesthetic 
21  In exploring the Rancièrean theatrical metaphor for politics in my proposal for 
aesthetic education, I am indebted to Lewis’s work (especially Lewis 2014, 39–55).
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education. Art works work to reconfigure the stage of the sensible. 
Seeing the event of aesthetic education as a creation of a community 
is useful. In a discussion of communities provoked by works of art, 
Rancière introduced the notion of a community of sense. Because an 
art work can be viewed as a configuration of sense, an event of aes-
thetic education can also be viewed as a community of sense. What 
makes this kind of community interesting in connection to aesthetic 
education is its form as a dissensual figure. This means that they are 
open spaces for dissensus, providing a possible beginning point for 
the process of politics. A dissensual community is being-together in 
being-apart—thus revealing the fundamental tension underlying all 
communities. As such, these communities are in continual shift and so 
are the communities born out of the being-together in aesthetic educa-
tion.
The aesthetic cut is something that the project of Rancièrean aes-
thetic education has to acknowledge. According to Rancière, there’s no 
direct route from aesthetic effect to political action. This could be read 
as another statement of the limitation of the politics of aesthetics, but 
here it is used to different function. Through it, Rancièrean aesthetic 
education becomes radically antiteleological. This is necessary, because 
there’s simply no way to calculate the effects, no direct lines to follow. 
The aesthetic education is only a staging of the its own eventness, 
nothing more—it cannot flag a way for its participants to follow.
What about change in Rancièrean aesthetic education? The process 
of politics might happen or might not happen on the stage of aesthet-
ic education. If it happens, it will reconfigure the sensible reality, the 
distribution of the sensible. This means the playing out of the process 
of politics, and it creates inscriptions of equality in the distribution 
of the sensible. This notion of change escapes totalization in that the 
reconfiguration is always something that happens in our already exist-
ing sensible reality. In the space and time perceptible to us—it doesn’t 
become some aim in the distant future.
This picture of Rancièrean aesthetic education points to action that 
verifies equality. These events open up possibilities for acknowledging 
the capabilities of each and every: the Rancièrean meaning of emanci-
pation.
To recapitulate, the politics of aesthetics and the aesthetics of poli-
tics should be acknowledged. This brings about the acceptance of the 
polemical nature of human being-together. The aesthetic doesn’t play 
out the process of politics, but instead becomes the stage of Rancièrean 
aesthetic education. But there’s a further result of avoiding the metapo-
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litical danger: the aesthetic provides possibilities for reconfiguring the 
sensible fabric of our social reality. Accepting the aesthetic cut makes 
Rancièrean aesthetic education antiteleological. This means that the 
emancipatory potential of education is accepted and the project doesn’t 
itself become the goal, but the playing out of politics, our interactions 
in the common sensible reality, gain their importance.
I think this proposal is able to combine some key insights of 
Rancière’s philosophy in a conceptualization of education. The un-
derstanding of the aesthetic nature of politics is facilitated without 
falling into the trap of metapolitics. Elaborating on the sensible fabric 
of being-together sheds light on not just the tension underlying it but 
also provides ways to engage with it. And also, the Rancièrean project 
of rethinking emancipation is utilized: collective emancipation as the 
verification of equality is also considered.
The conceptualization of social and change open up ways to think 
of new ways of struggling against suffocating conditions in our con-
temporary world. For example, in jagodzinski’s designer capitalism, it 
is only a leap outside facilitated by some art, that enables change. As a 
reconfiguration of the sensible, the change is something that happens 
in the sensible fabric of our reality. As the inscriptions of equality are 
carved to this fabric, something happens but it’s not a revolution. In 
terms of struggle, this facilitates thinking anew the ways of resistance.
Rancière’s understanding of the aesthetic and its possibilities in con-
nection with art is not seen as something that magically rescues edu-
cation or the social from inequality or from the grasp of capitalism’s 
control. Aesthetic art works have a role in the project of emancipation 
as enabling reconfiguring the sensible and opening up dissensus. Noth-
ing more, nothing less.
Before turning to the limits of my account, it should be noted that 
this exposition of Rancièrean aesthetic education is works as a phil-
osophical interrogation of the ways of conceptualizing the relations 
between art, education and politics—it cannot be evaluated as provid-
ing guidelines directly applicable in art classrooms. It is also limited in 
its power of being applied to concrete questions of art making practice, 
art education practices and curriculum design.
In Tervo’s dissertation, we find the need to augment Rancièrean 
conception of subjectivation with Agamben’s take on it—to interrogate 
how Rancière’s process of subjectivation through dis-identification 
is always an act: something that needs to actualize. Thus there’s no 
room for the actualization not to take place. This is complemented in 
the treatment of Agamben’s “whateverness”, his conception of sub-
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jectivation. (Tervo 2014, 12.) Thus Rancière’s focus on action is also a 
restriction since it seems to prescribe subjectivation as a certain kind 
of state—action. In Tervo’s work we see that the possibilities opened 
by not actualizing but remaining potential are just as interesting and 
radical. My proposal for Rancièrean aesthetic education is also unable 
to capture treat this potentiality.
Tervo also find something missing from the coupling of the two 
theorizations. Through a reading of Finnish performance artist Pilvi 
Takala’s art work, The Trainee, a temporal aspect is touched upon. This 
move is needed in order to enlarge theorization “to the very taking 
place of learning qua a political act, which allowed me to discuss polit-
ical subjectification as an event that has a precarious duration.” (Tervo 
2014, 291–292.) This is also an evident lack in my conceptualization of 
Rancièrean aesthetic education.
Lewis finds several things either unarticulated or undertheorised in 
Rancière’s work. Most importantly Lewis notes that Rancière’s rethink-
ing of emancipation doesn’t mention freedom, but relies entirely on 
equality. Lewis uncovers the connection to Kantian formulations of 
freedom and attributes them to him. (Lewis 2014, 73–82.) A concept of 
emancipation that doesn’t refer to freedom seems problematic at first, 
and in the context of aesthetic education with an emphasis on equality 
verifying action, the tensions between freedom and equality, should be 
conceptualized.
Kurt Thumlert sets out to enlarge Rancièrean theorization and he 
finds connections between the new amateurs and the universal teach-
ing of Jacotot-Rancière. In Thumlert’s reading of Jacotot’s pedagogic 
adventures, “novice learners [were permitted] to improvisationally 
engage the same resources and technologies, and to experimentally 
do the same things as “the master”.” In this way, the learners enact 
dis-identification through “acts that demonstrate equality.” An affor-
dance of equality is for Thumlert “any media form or technology that 
supports […] improvisation by anyone; the experimental enactment of 
common talents and artistic capacities that are, as such, the property of 
no one in particular, or of anyone at all.” (Thumlert 2015, 118, 121.) 
Thumlert’s article shows the possibility of putting Rancièrean theory 
into practice by locating problematics within art education contexts. In 
the conclusion-section of the paper, Thumlert considers “how formal 
spaces of learning might be made porous to these affordances of equal-
ity and the forms of agency they support.” So the goal is not to inves-
tigate how new technologies could be used in the context of schooling 
but instead, see how they can “disrupt our most stultifying educational 
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conventions.” (Thumlert 2015, 123.) Thumlert’s article is a great exam-
ple of putting Rancière’s ideas to work and this brings out a fundamen-
tal restriction of my philosophical approach: practice remains some-
where unattainable.
To summarize, I locate the following things undertheorized or entire-
ly lacking in Rancière’s writing and which remain inadequately treated 
in my proposal for Rancièrean aesthetic education. The questions of 
potentiality, and actualization: how should Rancièrean theorization 
encounter its own imperative of action? The question of freedom and 
especially what it means in relation to equality? And last but not least: 
what is the relation Rancièrean theorization could have with action? 
How could a conceptualization of Rancièrean aesthetic education be 
put to work?
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8. Conclusions
In an engagement with Rancière’s writings on education, I have been 
able to rethink the concept of emancipation as equality verifying 
action. Through Rancière’s writings on politics I have elaborated on 
the connections between aesthetics and politics, uncovering the aes-
thetic nature of politics and the way the aesthetic can have effects on 
the political. This enabled me to look at how to re-conceptualize art 
education’s politics. I have presented my proposal for what Rancièrean 
aesthetic education could be and I argue that it provides a renewed 
understanding of emancipation, as well as the political, in the context 
of art education.
The key challenge for Rancièrean aesthetic education is to escape the 
danger of metapolitics: the politics of aesthetics and the aesthetics of 
politics should both be acknowledged. This is highlighted for example 
when we think about analogies in conceptualizations of contemporary 
art and pedagogical models, such as relational art and relational peda-
gogy (see Lewis 2013). Accepting this danger brings out the polemical 
nature of human being-together.
Art itself is not interesting for Rancièrean aesthetic education, but 
the aesthetic is—encompassing non-art and art alike. This is of course 
parallel to the developments of visual culture education, but here we 
reach the conclusion from a particular philosophical orientation. The 
aesthetic doesn’t play out the process of politics, but instead becomes 
the stage of Rancièrean aesthetic education. The aesthetic also sets out 
the limits within which we can avoid the metapolitical danger: it can 
reconfigure the distribution of the sensible and open up possibilities 
for dissensus, nothing more.
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Rancièrean aesthetic education remains antiteleological as a result 
of the aesthetic cut. There’s no longer a correspondence between cause 
and effect, and the project of Rancièrean aesthetic education remains 
itself without a goal. This means that the emancipatory potential of 
education is accepted and the project doesn’t itself become the goal, 
but the playing out of politics, our interactions in the common sensible 
reality, take central stage.
The things that need further theorization in this theoretical constella-
tion are, first, questions of potentiality, and actualization. The emphasis 
on action creates a mobilizing imperative in Rancièrean theorization, 
that should be somehow resolved. A possible solution might be to the-
orize it as somehow remaining in suspension, like the tensional foun-
dation of all communities. 
Rancièrean notion of emancipation without reference to freedom 
should also be evaluated in more detail. If we leave out the concept of 
freedom, do we lose something? Could we find a conceptualization 
of freedom compatible with Rancière’s notion of equality? What does 
it mean only to talk about verification of equality and not talk about 
freedom to act?
The most significant problem is methodological. Rancière has em-
phasized the role of action throughout his writings but what is the re-
lation between Rancièrean theorization and practice? If theory comes 
first, do we necessarily have a position of mastery before us? This is a 
relevant worry for this thesis. 
In my construction of this thesis, we can find a linear passage from 
gathering theoretical tools (my reading of Rancière), testing them out 
(as in the encounter with jagodzinski) to combining them to a theory 
(my proposal for Rancièrean aesthetic education). But to make such 
conclusions on the basis of form alone is too hasty. The linearity of 
passage assumes a conventional reading habit, which might not be 
the case in the usual case: a reader might just as well leaf through the 
source-listing and check the conclusions before even thinking about 
reading the whole thing from cover to cover. It’s also arguable that 
to see reading a text as a continuous, linear passage from some ini-
tial stage to the end, is naive. The cognitive work is undoubtedly full 
of breaks and discontinuations. I think that a research report can be 
viewed like the Télémaque—what’s important, is how and in what kind 
of a situation it is used. My proposal for Rancièrean aesthetic educa-
tion should gain its significance in how it can be used.
But the real challenge is not the formal staging of this research re-
port. It is how I just proposed use this thesis: as a theoretical constella-
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tion that should be into practice. Is it enough that I state that it should 
not denote principles and lay out a foundation prescribing what needs 
to be done?
These are dangers Rancière has also faced and tried to avoid by his 
egalitarian method and topographical analysis. To recapitulate the ways 
that we have seen this method in action in this thesis, the first manifes-
tation of this methodological position is to treat materials in an egali-
tarian manner. This came down to, for example, giving the same kind 
of attention to Plato’s dialogues and passages extracted from workers’ 
journals. The second manifestation is the topographical analysis. For 
example, the ignorance of the worker is not assumed, but instead he/
she is listened to by taking seriously the enunciations in the worker’s 
journal. This means that the subterranean is not uncovered through 
analysis of the real condition of the worker, from the unconscious or 
from somewhere else. Instead the topography of the given situation 
is revealed. It’s opposite in this case might be a Marxist analysis, that 
would suppose the worker’s ignorance from his true condition, in 
which the analysis reveals something that’s otherwise hidden.
But in what ways do my research choices exemplify an egalitarian 
position? As a theoretical work with a philosophical approach, I think 
the possibilities of egalitarian method haven’t been fully utilized in this 
thesis. But in the context of theorization, I think the positioning of my 
interpretation of Rancière has approximated this method. I steered 
away from an exegetical outlook, from trying to uncover what Rancière 
really said. Instead, I presented a topographical analysis mapping the 
landscape in preparation for my own proposal.
In my choice of materials, I tried to lower Rancière from the pedal 
of the philosopher by orchestrating an encounter between jagodzinski. 
Through this I was able to interrogate the limits of a Rancièrean posi-
tion and the clash revealed some limits. Thus the Rancièrean frame-
work was not just taken as given and conclusive. Instead this clash 
could even be viewed as a case of dissensus when disagreements about, 
for example, concepts of change (as a redistribution and a revolution) 
were revealed22.
In positioning my theorization, I avoided an exegetical outlook. This 
is why my research question was formulated as “what Rancièrean aes-
thetic education could be”. Thus it was meant as non-conclusive and up 
for further development. Also this move resisted the work becoming 
that of the master prescribing what others should think and do, but to 
22  It should be noted that this process does not count as the playing out of the 
process of politics.
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present something to be used.
To shift the focus more generally to method: how does the idea of 
a topographical analysis connect to the notion of the aesthetic? The 
distribution of the sensible could be argued to also include theoretical 
works. This thesis includes configurations of sense just as the computer 
lab it has been typed in. This situates theoretical works and theoretical 
practice within the same sensory fabric as everything else, nothing 
beyond or above. Theorizations effect our faculties and modalities, 
practices and positions, just as the other sensible things around us.
And to view theoretical work as part of the sensible fabric means that 
it’s also susceptible to reconfiguration. Maybe egalitarian method can 
be seen as making its own inscriptions of equality—maybe theoretical 
equality—into the distribution of the sensible?
But is this enough? I think that to truly explore the possibilities and 
limits of an egalitarian method would mean interrogating the limits of 
theorization itself. What can we find when we suspend the dichotomy 
of theory and practice? Could we develop theorization as action and 
action as theorization? When seeing theorization itself as part of the 
same sensible fabric, this becomes feasible in from the philosophical 
perspective. This would mean to explore Rancièrean aesthetic edu-
cation as practice and theory: to interrogate the limits, connections, 
breaks and tensions in the sensible that it would be.
What are some other further possibilities of development for a con-
ceptualization of Rancièrean aesthetic education? Mapping out its al-
lies: what theorists could be aligned in this project? Tervo’s dissertation 
(Tervo 2014) shows how Rancière can be coupled with a philosopher in 
many ways opposed to him in a fruitful way, without downplaying the 
tensions evident. By a move away from just focusing on Rancière, an 
aesthetic education could be enlarged. For example, the work of Alain 
Badiou might provide further tools to engage the event of aesthetic 
education possibly helping with issues of temporality. The affectual side 
of politics could be interrogated with a Deleuzo-Guattarian framework.
Since aesthetic education can be seen as encapsulating art education, 
the relations between art education theorization should be interrogat-
ed in more depth. A brief encounter with jagodzinski in this study has 
shown that an engagement of this kind can be highly encouraging. This 
should be understood as a possibility of new theoretical findings. Also, 
the fundamental problem in the relation between theory and practice 
could probably be best interrogated in this encounter. What better 
scene to engage action and theory of aesthetic education, than in the 
scene of art education?
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Developing the egalitarian method of theorizing is another interest-
ing aspect that should be taken another look at. What kind of breaks 
between divisions of disciplines could art education research facilitate? 
In what ways could Rancièrean theorization be enlarged by these, or 
vice-versa?
The significance of this master’s thesis is in its attempt at rethinking 
central concepts of the critical tradition within art education theoriza-
tion: emancipation and politics. Through Rancièrean rethinking of the 
aesthetic, this becomes situated in a deeply interconnected framework. 
All of this is connected to contemporary debates in Anglo-American 
art education discussions (as exemplified in the literature sited before 
in this study), but also to the Finnish discussions. For example, art 
educator and theorist Mira Kallio-Tavin has explored the notion of art 
education for social justice and the ways art teachers could act as ac-
tivists (Kallio-Tavin 2015, 27–29). At the philosophical level of re-con-
ceptualizing fundamental concepts such as politics and emancipation 
in the framework of aesthetic education, this thesis engages in its own 
way with similar questions about art and its education.
In connection to using the lesson of the Ignorant Schoolmaster 
Rancière noted that:
“Equality is fundamental and absent, timely and untimely, always 
up to the initiative of individuals and groups who, set against the 
ordinary course of events, take the risk of verifying their equality, of 
inventing individual and collective forms for its verification. Affir-
mation of these simple principles in fact constitutes an unprece-
dented dissonance, a dissonance one must, in a way, forget in order 
to continue improving schools, programs and pedagogies, but that 
one must also, from time to time, listen to again so that the act of 
teaching does not lose sight of the paradoxes that give it meaning.” 
(from Rancière 2010 b, 15–16.)
I am sure that the same applies to the lesson of Rancièrean aesthetic 
education.
52
9. Sources
Atkinson, D. 2011. Art, Equality and Learning. Pedagogies Against the 
State. Rotterdam, Sense Publishers.
Atkinson, D., 2012. Contemporary Art and Art in Education: The New, 
Emancipation and Truth. iJADE 31.1, pp. 5–18.
Bingham, C. and Biesta, G., 2010. Jacques Rancière. Education, Truth, 
Emancipation. London, Continuum. 
De Broever, A. 2012. Scenes of Aesthetic Education: Rancière, Oedi-
pus, and Notre Musique. Journal of Aesthetic Educaition, Vol. 46. No. 
3, Fall 2012, pages 69–82.
Deleuze, G., 1992. Postscript on the Societies of Control. October, Vol. 
59. (Winter, 1992), pp. 3–7.
Garoian, C., 2014. In the Event That Art and Teaching Encounter. 
Studies in Art Education 56(1), pages 384–396.
jagodzinski, j., 2008. Postmetaphysical Vision: Art Education’s Chal-
lenge In an Age of Globalized Aesthetics (A Mondofesto). Studies in 
Art Education 49(2), pages 147–160.
jagodzinski, j., 2009. Beyond Aesthetics: Returning Force and Truth to 
Art and Its Education (2009). Studies in Art Education; Summer 2009, 
50(4), pages 338–351.
jagodzinski, j., 2013. Anonymous: The Occupy Movement and the 
Failure of Representational Democracy. The Journal of Social Theory 
53
in Art Education (33), pages 21–37.
jagodzinski, j., 2015. The Challenges of Art Education in Designer 
Capitalism: Collaborative Practices in the (New Media) Arts. iJADE 
34.4, pages 282–295.
Kallio-Tavin, M. 2015. Becoming Culturally Diversified. In Kallio-Ta-
vin, M. and Pullinen, J. (ed.) 2015. Conversations on Finnish Art 
Education. Helsinki, Aalto ARTS Books, pages 20–32.
Lewis, T., E. 2014 (first published in 2012). The Aesthetics of Educa-
tion. Theatre, Curiosity, and Politics in the work of Jacques Rancière 
and Paulo Freire. New York, Bloomsbury Academic.
Lewis, T., E. 2013. Jacques Rancière’s Aesthetic Regime and Democrat-
ic Education. Journal of Aesthetic Education, Vol. 47, No. 2, Summer 
2013, pages 49–70.
Lewis, T., E. 2015. “Move Around! There is Something to See Here”: 
The Biopolitics of the Perceptual Pedagogy of the Arts. Studies in Art 
Education, 57 (1), pages 53–62.
McDonnell, J. 2014. Reimagining the Role of Art in the Relationship 
between Democracy and Education. Educational Philosophy and The-
ory, 2014 Vol. 46, No. 1, 46–58.
Pohjakallio, P., 2015. Unnamed introduction to a section. In Pohjakal-
lio, P. and Kallio-Tavin, M. (ed.) 2015. Kuvis sata: Kuvataideopettajien 
koulutus 1915–2015. Helsinki, Aalto ARTS Books, pages 66–67.
Rancière, J. 1991 (original published in French 1987 as Maître igno-
rant). The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emanci-
pation. Stanford, Stanford University Press.
Rancière, J. 1999 (original published in French in 1995 as La mésen-
tente: Politique et philosophie). Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy. 
Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press. 
Rancière, J. 2004 (original published in French in 2000 as Le partage 
du sensible: Esthétique et politique). The Politics of Aesthetics. Trans-
lated by Rockhill, G. London, Continuum. 
Rancière, J. 2009 a (original published in French 2008 as Le spectateur 
émancipé). The Emancipated Spectator. (Translated by Gregory El-
liott.) London, Verso.
54
Rancière, J. 2009 b. A few remarks on the method of Jacques Rancière. 
Parallax, 15:3, pages 114–123.
Rancière, Jacques 2010 a Ten Theses on Politics. In Corcoran, Steven 
(ed. and transl.) 2010. Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics. London, 
Continuum.
Rancière, J. 2010 b (Original presented in 2002 in ). On Ignorant 
Schoolmasters. In Bingham, C and Biesta, G. 2010. Jacques Rancière. 
Education, Truth, Emancipation. Pages 1-16. London, Continuum. 
Rancière, J. 2010 c. Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man? In Dissen-
sus: On Politics and Aesthetics, pages 62-75. (Edited and translated by 
Steven Corcoran). London, Continuum
Rancière, J. 2011. A Politics of Aesthetic Indetermination: An Inter-
view with Frank Ruda & Jan Voelker. Translated by Smith, Jason E.. 
In Smith, Jason, E. and Weisser, Annette 2011 (ed.). Everything is in 
Everything. Jacques Rancière Between Intellectual Emancipation and 
Aesthetic Education, pages 10–33. Pasadena, Art Center Graduate 
Press.
Tervo, J. 2012. The Problem of Representation. Studies in Art Educa-
tion 54(1), pages 81–83.
Tervo, J. (2014). Corrosive Subjectifications: Theorizing Radical Politics 
of Art Education in the Intersection of Jacques Ranciere and Giorgio 
Agamben. (Electronic Thesis or Dissertation). Retrieved from https://
etd.ohiolink.edu/ 
Thumlert, K. 2015. Affordances of Equality: Ranciere, Emerging 
Media, and the New Amateur. Studies in Art Education, 56 (2), pages 
114–126.
Wallin, J. 2012. Bon mots for bad thoughts. Discourse: Studies in the 
Cultural Politics of Education. Vol. 33, No. 1, pages 147–162. 
